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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 29, 2002, Dwayne Giles shot and killed his ex-girlfriend,
Brenda Avie, outside the garage of his grandmother's house.1  At his murder
trial, Giles admitted shooting her six times.2 But although she was unarmed,
1. People v. Giles, 152 P.3d 433, 435-36 (Cal. 2007), vacated and remanded, 128 S. Ct.
2678 (2008).
2. All six rounds struck Ms. Avie near her torso. Id. at 436. As Justice Scalia wrote:
One wound was consistent with Avie's holding her hand up at the time she was shot,
another was consistent with her having turned to her side, and a third was consistent
with her having been shot while lying on the ground. Giles fled the scene after the
shooting. He was apprehended by police about two weeks later and charged with
murder.
Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2681 (2008).
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he testified that he acted in self-defense. 3  He supported this claim by
describing Ms. Avie's purported prior acts of violence, telephone threats she
made against him and his new girlfriend on the day of the shooting, and her
menacing behavior immediately before he shot her.
5
To cast doubt on Giles's testimony that Ms. Avie was the initial aggressor,
the prosecutor called Police Officer Stephen Kotsinadelis, who testified that
about three weeks before the shooting, he and his partner responded to a
domestic violence report.7 Giles, who appeared agitated, came to the door and
admitted the officers.8 Kotsinadelis testified that he spoke to Ms. Avie while
his partner stayed with Giles.9 Ms. Avie told Kotsinadelis that Giles had
accused her of being unfaithful, physically assaulted her, choked her, punched
her, and, wielding a knife, had threatened to kill her if she cheated on him.'
0
Ms. Avie's statements to the officer were hearsay: out-of-court statements
offered at trial to prove the truth of the matter asserted," that is, to prove that
Giles had in fact accused, assaulted, choked, punched, and threatened her. The
trial court overruled Giles's hearsay objection per California Evidence Code
Section 1370, which admits hearsay statements that describe the infliction or
threats of physical injury made on a declarant where the declarant is
unavailable and the statements are deemed trustworthy. 12 Giles was convicted
of first degree murder and sentenced to fifty years to life.13
3. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2681.
4. Id. Giles testified that Avie had once shot a man, that she had used a knife to threaten
others, and that, on previous occasions, she had vandalized his home and car. Id.
5. Id.
6. The California intermediate appellate court decision lists the date of this incident as
September 5, 2001, People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 846 (Ct. App. 2004), but it is clear from
the rest of the facts related in that opinion and every other reported opinion in the case that this is
a typographical error; the incident in fact occurred in September of 2002, only weeks before Ms.
Avie was killed, see id. at 845-46; see also Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2681.
7. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2681-82. As a rule, evidence of a defendant's other crimes, wrongs,
and acts are inadmissible to prove a defendant's propensity as a way of suggesting he committed
the crime for which he is currently on trial. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101 (West 2009); see also
FED. R. EvID. 404(b). Evidence of Giles's prior assault on Ms. Avie was admitted per California
Evidence Code Section 1109, an exception to Section 1101, which admits evidence of a
defendant's other acts of domestic violence. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 846.
8. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 846.
9. Id.
10. Id. Neither the Supreme Court decision nor either of the reported state court decisions
specifies whether the officer testified during the state's case-in-chief or in rebuttal after the
defendant testified.
11. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200; see also FED. R. EVID. 801 (c).
12. This provision is discussed in Part IV.G.4, infra.
13. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 844-45.
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Up to this point, there was nothing particularly unusual about Giles's case.
Men assault, rape, and kill their present or former wives and girlfriends with
appalling frequency. 
14
While Giles's appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court, in
Crawford v. Washington, rejected its prior interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause and replaced it with one that created
potential new barriers to hearsay evidence. 15  Although Crawford did not
involve allegations of domestic violence, its potential effect on domestic
violence prosecutions, which often rely on hearsay evidence, was obvious.
16
Although Giles had not asserted a Confrontation Clause objection to
admission of Ms. Avie's statements to Officer Kotsinadelis, the California
appellate courts permitted Giles to raise the issue on appeal.' 7  The state
supreme court ultimately rejected Giles's Confrontation Clause claim' 8 on the
ground that, by killing Ms. Avie, Giles had forfeited his right to confront and
cross-examine her.'
9
In 2008, the United States Supreme Court, in a decision that produced five
opinions and only a conditional majority, 20 held in Giles v. California that the
state courts had used an incorrect standard in applying the forfeiture doctrine,
one that was too generous to prosecutors. 21 It therefore vacated Giles's
conviction, and remanded for further consideration. 22  At first look, this
appears to be a victory not only for Giles, but for defendants in general.
Because of the many opinions filed in the case, however, substantial questions
exist as to what the correct standard is, and how it should be applied and
litigated. Moreover, there are indications in Giles that the Crawford approach
to the Confrontation Clause may apply in only comparatively narrow factual
14. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
15. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). The Confrontation Clause, and
Crawford's (re)construction of it, are discussed infra at Part II.C.
16. See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REv. 747, 752
(2005) (arguing that "Crawford calls into question many of the strategies previously used by
prosecutors in domestic violence cases"); Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and Children
Too: Crawford's Impact on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 311,
312 (2005) (criticizing the historical basis for the Court's reasoning in Crawford); Jeanine
Percival, Note, The Price of Silence: The Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases in Light of
Crawford v. Washington, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 213, 216 (2005) (arguing that "the framework the
Court created is unworkable and problematic for the prosecution of domestic violence cases").
See also United States v. Hall, 419 F.3d 980, 989 (9th Cir. 2005) (declining to extend Crawford's
testimonial restriction to a domestic violence allegation); Davis v. State, 169 S.W.3d 660, 671
(Tex. App. 2005) (noting that the "proper interpretation of Crawford can have a great impact
upon" domestic violence trials in which the victim does not testify).
17. See People v. Giles, 152 P.3d 433, 437 (Cal. 2007).
18. Id. at 435.
19. Id.
20. See discussion infra Part III.B. I.
21. See Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2693 (2008).
22. Id.
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settings; if this proves to be the case, Giles might wind up helping prosecutors
as much, if not more, than it helps defendants.
This Article examines the implications of Giles v. California. It begins in
Part 1I by examining the Confrontation Clause before Giles, and explains how
Crawford upended the Clause's prior interpretation in Ohio v. Roberts23 by
excluding all "testimonial" statements, however "trustworthy" a court might
consider them to be. It then provides a brief explanation of the forfeiture
doctrine and its endorsement in Crawford. Part III consists of a detailed
examination and critique of the Court's resolution of the central issue in Giles:
that the forfeiture doctrine applies only when the prosecution can show that the
defendant killed the victim-declarant with the intent of preventing her from
testifying. It scrutinizes the majority, two concurrences, and dissent, and posits
that because of the content of the opinions, the view garnered only a
conditional majority at best. Part IV explores how the forfeiture issue should
be litigated, and in particular, how a prosecutor should attempt to satisfy the
Giles "intent to silence" requirement in a variety of contexts: domestic
homicides, domestic assaults, and crimes unrelated to domestic relationships.
It also provides an overview of the hearsay exceptions that will often overcome
a defendant's hearsay exception. Part V shows how four of the Giles opinions
can be read to evince a willingness to either reconsider or narrow the definition
of testimonial. Part VI provides a brief conclusion.
II. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE: ROBERTS; CRA WFORD; DAVIS
A. The Confrontation Clause
The Sixth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the
witnesses against him . ,24 American courts have long agreed that "to be
confronted" means the right to be in the courtroom with a witness, to look at
him face-to-face, and to cross-examine him.25  Thus, the scope of the
23. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
25. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988) ("[Tlhe Confrontation Clause guarantees the
defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact."). The
Supreme Court has recognized only one exception to this definition of confrontation. Where a
child is to testify against his or her alleged abuser and the prosecutor persuades the judge that the
child will be unable to do so in the defendant's physical presence or that the child will suffer
considerable trauma by doing so, the child may testify in a separate room-so long as cameras
and TV screens are positioned so that the defendant, judge, and jury can all see the child, and the
child can see the defendant-if the child chooses to look at the screen. Maryland v. Craig, 497
U.S. 836, 840-43 (1990). For an analysis of Craig and its progeny, see 4 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN
& ANNE T. McKENNA, JONES ON EVIDENCE §§ 25A:51-:56, at 176-93 (7th ed. Supp. 2008).
The continued validity of this body of case law is questionable in light of Crawford v.
Washington.
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Confrontation Clause, at least to a textualist, depends on how one reads the
word "witness." There are three plausible interpretations.
26
The narrowest view restricts "witness" to someone who actually takes the
stand and testifies at the defendant's criminal trial.27 This would assure the
defendant the right to confront only those who actually testify against him at
trial, but the admissibility of all out-of-court (that is, hearsay) statements made
by declarants who do not testify would be beyond the scope of the Clause, and
would be regulated solely by the rules of evidence governing hearsay. A
majority of the court said in 1992 that "[s]uch a narrow reading of the
Confrontation Clause, which would virtually eliminate its role in restricting the
admission of hearsay testimony, is foreclosed by our prior cases" dating at
least to 1895.28
The broadest view is that the term "witness" applies to anyone whose
statement is offered against the defendant.29 The effect would be to preclude
the prosecutor from introducing any hearsay evidence at all unless the
declarant actually testifies at trial, a result the Court has properly rejected as
"too extreme."
30
The middle view is that, in addition to in-court testimony, the Clause applies
to some, but not all, hearsay evidence. American courts have always
understood this middle approach to be the correct one.31 Thus, the challenge is
to define which hearsay statements are subject to the Clause, and which are
not.
B. Roberts
From 1980 until the Crawford decision in 2004, application of the
Confrontation Clause was governed by the standard articulated by the Supreme
Court in Ohio v. Roberts.32  In that case the Court, reasoning that the
underlying goal of the Clause was to safeguard against the use of
untrustworthy evidence, held that a prosecutor could introduce hearsay
statements without also calling the declarant as a witness, so long as the
statement had sufficient "indicia of reliability. '33  Reliability could be
established in either of two ways. One was to show that the statement came
26. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42-43 (2004).
27. See id.
28. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 352 (1992) (citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S.
237 (1895)).
29. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62-63 (1980).
30. Id. at 63 ("[l]f thus applied, the Clause would abrogate virtually every hearsay
exception, a result long rejected as unintended and too extreme.").
31. White, 502 U.S. at 352 ("[W]e have consistently sought to 'stee[r] a middle course
.... ." (alteration in original) (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 68, n.9)).
32. 448 U.S. 56.
33. Id. at 66 (quoting Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972)).
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within a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception.34 If a hearsay statement did not
fall within a "firmly rooted" exception, a prosecutor could demonstrate the
statement's reliability by making a "showing of particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.
' 35
C. Crawford: The "Testimonial" Test
In the summer of 1999, Kenneth Lee allegedly tried to rape Michael
Crawford's wife, Sylvia.36 A few hours later, when the Crawfords confronted
Lee, Michael Crawford stabbed him.37 Michael pleaded self-defense, claiming
that he thought Lee was reaching for a weapon.38 To rebut this defense, the
prosecutor played a recording of Sylvia's interview with the police,39 which
cast doubts on Michael's version of events.4 0 At trial and on appeal, Crawford
argued that admitting the recording violated his Sixth Amendment right to be
"confronted with the witnesses against him., 41
In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court, per Justice Scalia, held that
admitting Sylvia's hearsay statement violated Michael Crawford's rights under
42the Confrontation Clause. In so doing, the Court rejected the Roberts
43approach to the Confrontation Clause for three main reasons.
First, the Court concluded that the Roberts approach was inconsistent with
the history of the Confrontation Clause. g According to Justice Scalia's
reading of the history, the clause was included in the Sixth Amendment to
preclude a prosecutor from using at trial pretrial judicial interviews of
witnesses, conducted in the defendant's absence, where those witnesses were
absent from the trial itself.4 5 Although the ultimate purpose of the Clause was
to help assure that criminal convictions were based on reliable and trustworthy
evidence, Justice Scalia insisted that the Founders intended to accomplish this
objective by mandating a specific procedure, that is, the right to confront and
46cross-examine. Justice Scalia observed that "[d]ispensing with confrontation
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38 (2004).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 38-40.
39. Sylvia did not testify at trial because Crawford invoked Washington's marital privilege,
"which generally bars a spouse from testifying without the other spouse's consent." Id at 40
(citing WASH. REv. CODE § 5.60.060(1) (1994)).
40. Id. at 39.
41. Id. at 40.
42. Id. at 68-69.
43. Id. at 65-69.
44. Id. at 60.
45. Id. at 53-54.
46. Id. at 61 ("To be sure, the Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but
it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable,
but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of
Catholic University Law Review
because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial
because a defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth
Amendment prescribes.
'A7
Second, the Roberts "trustworthiness" rule was so vague and imprecise that
it was impossible to apply objectively, 48 and therefore afforded excessive
discretion to judges in direct violation of a constitutional right.
49
The third and greatest shortcoming of the Roberts approach, Justice Scalia
wrote in Crawford, was that it permitted judges to admit into evidence "core
testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to
exclude. 50  The Confrontation Clause must be read to exclude any
"testimonial" statement that a prosecutor offers into evidence, unless the
declarant testifies at trial, or unless the defendant had an opportunity to
confront and cross-examine the declarant on a previous occasion. 51 Such a
"core class of 'testimonial' statements," Justice Scalia added, include
statements extracted during custodial interrogations; 52 guilty plea allocutions
by a defendant, when offered against a non-pleading defendant, to show the
existence of a conspiracy;53 and testimony given at a prior trial or proceeding
at which the defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.
Each of these, the majority stated, was the functional equivalent of the judicial
questioning the Confrontation Clause was intended to exclude from evidence
at trial.55
Thus, a key question in post-Crawford Confrontation Clause litigation is
whether the statement in question is "testimonial." The Court did not provide
an explicit definition of the term, but offered several hints. First, it observed,
"[a]n off-hand, overheard remark might be unreliable evidence and thus a good
cross-examination. The Clause thus reflects a judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable
evidence (a point on which there could be little dissent), but about how reliability can best be
determined."). It was not intended to give judges a general right to admit or exclude hearsay
evidence based on their own assessments of trustworthiness. Id.
47. Id. at 62.
48. Id. at 63. Justice Scalia pointed out that some judges relied on certain factors to indicate
that a statement was reliable; other judges cited those same factors to indicate that a statement
was unreliable. Id.
49. See id. at 67.
50. Id. at 63.
51. Id. at 53-54.
52. Id. at 51. In Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137 (1999), a four-judge plurality strongly
suggested it was doubtful that "accomplice confessions implicating the accused could survive
Roberts." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63-64. Nevertheless, as Justice Scalia pointed out in Crawford,
"courts continue routinely to admit [accomplice confessions]." Id. at 64. The Court also noted
one study that found that after Lilly, appellate courts upheld the admission of such statements in
25 of 70 cases. Id. (citing Roger W. Kirst, Appellate Court Answers to the Confrontation
Questions in Lilly v. Virginia, 53 SYRACUSE L. REv. 87, 105 (2003)).
53. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63-64.
54. Id. at 57.
55. See id. at 68.
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candidate for exclusion under hearsay rules, but it bears little resemblance to
the civil-law abuses the Confrontation Clause targeted. 56 Second, the Court
continued by explaining that
[t]he text of the Confrontation Clause .. .applies to "witnesses"
against the accused-in other words, those who "bear testimony."
"Testimony," in turn, is typically "[a] solemn declaration or
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some
fact." An accuser who makes a formal statement to government
officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual
remark to an acquaintance does not.
57
It was unnecessary to provide a precise definition of "testimonial" to resolve
Crawford's case, the Court observed, because formal interrogation of a witness
by police officers, such as the one that elicited Sylvia Crawford's statement,
was clearly testimonial under any definition.58
D. The Forfeiture Doctrine
Although the Court in Crawford declined to provide a precise definition of
"testimonial," it offered several statements in dicta about when the Clause
would or would not exclude testimony. For example, the Court gratuitously
stated that business records and statements by co-conspirators clearly were not
testimonial. 59  Statements offered for a non-hearsay purpose would not run
afoul of the Confrontation Clause because their relevance did not depend on
the truth of the matter asserted. 60 And, of particular significance, the Court
stated: "the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes
confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds; it does not purport to be
56. Id. at51.
57. Id. (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN
AMERICAN DIcTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)). The Court also offered three
possible "formulations" of how a "testimonial statement" might be defined:
[ 1.] [E]x parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that is, material such
as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to
cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to
be used prosecutorially[.]
[2.] [E]xtrajudicial statements ...contained in formalized testimonial materials,
such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions[.]
[3.] [S]tatements that were made under circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at
a later trial.
Id. at 51-52 (omission in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
58. Id. at 61, 68.
59. Id. at 56. On November 10, 2008, the Court heard oral argument in Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, in which the Court was asked to determine whether laboratory reports are
"testimonial." See Transcript of Oral Argument at 3-4, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, No. 07-
591 (U.S. Nov. 10, 2008).
60. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9.
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an alternative means of determining reliability." 6' For this principle, the Court
cited Reynolds v. United States, a nineteenth century case in which the Court
held that if a defendant procured a declarant's unavailability to prevent the
declarant from testifying against him, he thereby forfeited his right to raise a
Confrontation Clause objection when the declarant's hearsay statements were
offered against him at trial.62
E. Davis v. Washington
In Davis v. Washington, the Supreme Court consolidated appeals in two
domestic violence cases, Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana.63
1. Davis v. Washington
During an emotional conversation with a 911 operator, Michelle McCottry
frantically told the operator that Davis, her former boyfriend, was "here
jumpin' on me again," and, in response to the operator's question, that he did
not have a weapon, "[h]e's usin' his fists." 64 She gave the operator Davis's
name, then added, "[h]e's runnin' now," meaning that Davis had 'just r[un]
out the door' after hitting Ms. McCottry, and that he was leaving in a car with
someone else." 65 The operator then proceeded to ask Ms. McCottry additional
questions about Davis and her relationship with him. 66 The police arrivedwithin four minutes of the 911 call. 67
2. Hammon v. Indiana
In Hammon, police officers responding to a "reported domestic disturbance"
found Mrs. Amy Hammon sitting alone on the front porch of the family
home.68 Although she seemed "somewhat frightened," she told them that
"nothing was the matter., 69 With her permission they entered the home and
saw evidence of minor damage and broken glass on the floor.70 Ultimately,
one of the officers interviewed Mrs. Hammon, who told him that her husband
had assaulted her; at the officer's request, she filled out and signed an affidavit
to that effect.7'
61. Id. at 62.
62. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158-59 (1878).
63. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 813 & n.* (2006).
64. Id. at 817. The 911 recording captures sounds of a male yelling in the background, but
it is unclear whether Davis was actually punching Ms. McCottry as she was speaking to the
operator.
65. Id. at 818 (second alteration in original).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id at 819 (internal quotation marks omitted).
69. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 820.
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3. "Testimonial" Versus "Non-Testimonial" Statements to the Police
Ms. McCottry did not testify at Davis's trial for felony violation of a
protection order; nor did Mrs. Hammon testify at her husband's trial for
72domestic violence and violation of his probation. In each case the police
officers testified about the woman's physical and emotional condition when
they arrived.73 The Washington prosecutor played the 911 recording against
Davis; the Indiana prosecutor introduced Mrs. Hammon's affidavit. Each
defendant was convicted and subsequently appealed, Davis arguing that the
911 recording, and Hammon that his wife's affidavit, should have been
excluded as testimonial.7 5
As it did in Crawford, the Court again in Davis declined to provide "an
exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements--or even all
conceivable statements in response to police interrogation-as either
testimonial or nontestimonial. '7 6 Rather, it set forth the following distinction
as sufficient to decide the Davis and Hammon cases:
Statements are non-testimonial when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to
meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
establish or R rove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.
Applying this test, the Court concluded that Ms. McCottry's statements to
the 911 operator before Davis left the scene were non-testimonial; 78 Ms.
McCottry's subsequent statements, and all of Mrs. Hammon's oral and written
statements to the police, were testimonial. 79  The Court also held that the
Confrontation Clause is simply inapplicable to non-testimonial statements.
8
0
72. Id. at 818-20.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 819-20.
75. Id. at 819, 821.
76. Id. at 822.
77. Id. The Court carefully noted that it restricted its discussion to statements elicited by
"interrogation" because those were the facts before it, and was making no suggestion regarding
the classification of statements not elicited by "interrogation." Id. at 822 n. 1. The Court assumed
without deciding that the 911 operator in that case was a "police agent," id. at 823 n.2, and that
her questioning of Ms. McCottry was therefore the functional equivalent of police interrogation,
see id.
78. Id. at 828.
79. Id. at 828-29, 831-32.
80. Id. at 825.
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4. Domestic Violence and the Forfeiture Doctrine
While insisting that those charged with domestic violence were entitled to
the full protection of the Confrontation Clause, the Court stressed:
[W]hen defendants seek to undermine the judicial process by
procuring or coercing silence from witnesses and victims, the Sixth
Amendment does not require courts to acquiesce. While defendants
have no duty to assist the State in proving their guilt, they do have
the duty to refrain from acting in ways that destroy the integrity of
the criminal-trial system. We reiterate what we said in Crawford:
that "the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing . . . extinguishes
confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds." That is, one
who obtains the absence of a witness by wrongdoing forfeits the
constitutional right to confrontation.
8 1
F. Non-Retroactivity: Whorton v. Bockting
In Whorton v. Bockting,82 the Court held that Crawford applied only
prospectively, not retroactively. 83  It also reiterated that the Confrontation
Clause applies only to testimonial statements, and does not affect the
admissibility of non-testimonial hearsay statements.
84
III. GILES v. CALIFORNIA
In 2008, the Supreme Court decided Giles v. California," its fourth
Confrontation Clause decision since Crawford.86 Giles, like the Hammon and
Davis incidents the Court examined in Davis v. Washington, involved a
domestic violence victim's statements elicited by police officers.87 The facts
in Giles differ from those in the Davis cases, however, in several significant
respects. First, unlike the statements in the Davis cases, which were made to
the police during or after the assault for which the defendant was on trial,8 the
victim's statements in Giles were made to the police three weeks before the
crime with which Giles was later charged. 9 Second, unlike the cases in Davis,
the prosecutor offered the victim's statement under a hearsay exception more
81. Id. at 833 (citation omitted) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004)).
82. 127 S. Ct. 1173 (2007).
83. Id. at 1181-84.
84. Id. at 1183.
85. 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
86. Davis consisted of two such cases, see discussion supra at Part ILE. Whorton v.
Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173 (2007), in which the Court held that Crawford was not retroactive, was
the third case. Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008), was, therefore, the fourth case.
87. The Court assumed in Davis that the 911 operator was acting as an agent of the police.
See supra note 77.
88. Washington v. Davis, 547 U.S. 813, 817-20 (2006).
89. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2681.
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or less akin to the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing concept, which the Supreme
Court had explicitly endorsed (albeit in dicta) in both Crawfora' and Davis.92
Third, unlike the hearsay declarant-complainants in the Hammon and Davis
cases, each of whom apparently chose (whether under compulsion or not) not
to testify against her assailant, the declarant in Giles could make no such
choice because she was dead: Giles had shot her six times and killed her.
93
A. The "Purpose" or "Design " Issue
California's Supreme Court held in Giles that the prosecutor could invoke
the forfeiture doctrine and introduce the declarant's testimonial statements
simply by proving to the judge, by a preponderance of the evidence, 94 that the
defendant killed the declarant; and that because the prosecutor satisfied this
burden, Ms. Avie's testimonial statements were properly admitted against
Giles, and the jury could consider them in deciding whether Giles's guilt has
been established beyond a reasonable doubt. 95 Some courts considering the
issue had held to the contrary, reasoning that the prosecutor must first establish
that the defendant's wrongdoing was committed with the purpose or motive of
preventing the declarant from testifying.96  However, the California court
rejected this approach under a simple equity theory, reasoning that a defendant
should not benefit from his own wrongdoing.
97
B. The Result in Giles: By the Numbers
Three Justices rejected the concept altogether, and those who endorsed it
produced different approaches to what it entailed and how it might be
established.
1. The Result
The holding of the Court, to the extent that the case can be said to have a
holding, is that the forfeiture doctrine applies only when the prosecutor can
90. Id. at 2682. See discussion of CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370 infra at Part IV.G.4. Although
at trial, the statements were originally offered under the California evidence provision that
permitted admission of statements regarding bodily injury occurring around the time of the threat,
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2682, the California appellate courts affirmed the admission of the statements
based on Crawford's recognition of the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception, decided during the
pendency of the California appeal, id By contrast, in the Davis and Hammon cases, the
prosecutor relied on the excited utterance exception to overcome the defendant's hearsay
objections. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 820; State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 847 (Wash. 2005) (en
banc).
91. 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004) (accepting the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing).
92. 547 U.S. at 833 (reiterating Crawford).
93. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2681.
94. Concerning this burden of proof, see infra Part IV.G. I.
95. People v. Giles, 152 P.3d 433, 445, 447 (Cal. 2007).
96. Id. at 442.
97. Id.
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establish that "the defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the
witness from testifying." 98 Because the state court had not applied the correct
standard in evaluating whether Giles had forfeited his rights under the
Confrontation Clause, the Court vacated his conviction and remanded,
observing that "the [state] court is free to consider evidence of the defendant's
intent on remand."99
The majority justified its conclusions on two primary bases: the history of
the Confrontation Clause and the forfeiture doctrine,1°° and the effect that a
contrary result would have on a defendant's right to trial by jury.'01 Given the
positions taken by the Justices in the five opinions written by Justices Scalia,
Souter, Thomas, Alito, and Breyer in the case, however, the best that can be
said is the Court's emphasis on the defendant's intent or purpose garnered the
support of only a conditional majority of the Justices. The fractured nature of
the decision is reflected in the fact that the phrase "we hold" does not appear
anywhere in any opinion filed by any Justice in the case.
02
2. By the Numbers
Justice Scalia delivered the Court's opinion.'0 3 Chief Justice Roberts joined
every aspect of that opinion.' °4 Justice Souter, with whom Justice Ginsburg
agreed, joined most of Justice Scalia's opinion,10 5 but not Part II-D-2 of that106 107
opinion. Excluding Part II-D-2, that brings the total number of votes to
98. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2680.
99. Id. at 2693. On remand, the state attempted to "entice" the California Supreme Court to
hold that, on the facts of the case, the error was harmless. E-mail from Donald DeNicola, Deputy
Solicitor General, Office of the Attorney General of California, Counsel for Respondent (Dec. 31,
2008, 03:35 EST) (on file with the Catholic University Law Review). The court, however,
remanded the case back to the California Court of Appeals for further proceedings. On remand,
the California Court of Appeals asked the parties to submit briefs addressing the question of
whether the victim's statements were in fact "testimonial," and if so, whether the evidence
"showed the witness-tampering 'motive' that Giles v. Calitfornia] said was required." Id.
The court of appeals found that, because of the absence of sufficient evidence submitted by the
prosecution at trial on either issue, the victim's statements were testimonial and a witness-
tampering motive was not shown. People v. Giles, 2d Crim. No. B166937, 2009 WL 457832, at
*3-4 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2009).
100. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2682-84; see also infra Part III.C. 1.
101. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2684-86; see also infra Part III.C.2.
102. Indeed, the phrase "designed to prevent," quoted in the previous paragraph, appears in a
sentence of Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court that discusses the history of the Confrontation
Clause. It is clear that this is the rationale that garnered the greatest support on the Court. See
infra Part III.C.3.
103. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2680.
104. Id.
105. Id. Justice Souter's opinion is discussed infra at Part IV.C.
106. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2680.
107. Part II-D-2 of Justice Scalia's opinion, and the discinlination of Justices Souter and
Ginsburg to join it, are discussed in Part III.C.4 of this Article.
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four. Although the syllabus that is published with the opinion indicates that
Justices Thomas and Alito joined Justice Scalia's entire opinion, including
Part-II-D-2,"° the content of their concurrences show why their votes should
not be reflexively counted as supporting that opinion. Indeed, as is set forth in
Part V, as a practical matter, Justice Thomas more accurately should be
counted as a vote against Justice Scalia's approach, and Justice Alito's support
for Justice Scalia is tentative at best.109
Three Justices-Justice Breyer, with whom Justices Stevens and Kennedy
joined-dissented from the Scalia-Roberts-Souter-Ginsburg-Alito majority,
arguing that it should suffice that the prosecutor establish that the defendant
knew that killing the declarant would preclude any possibility of the declarant
from testifying, whether or not that was the defendant's purpose or specific
intent. 1 0  In asserting this position, the dissent rejected both the majority's
reading of the Clause's history and the forfeiture doctrine and the majority's
concern about how the dissenters' approach would affect a defendant's right to
trial by jury. 1 ' The dissent also hinted at some dissatisfaction with the
classification of Ms. Avie's statement as testimonial. 12 The implications of
this aspect of the dissent, and the Alito-Thomas concurrences, are discussed in
Part V.
C. Rationale for the Decision: Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
1. The History of the Confrontation Clause and the Forfeiture Doctrine
Justice Scalia based his opinion primarily on his reading of the history of the
Confrontation Clause, the forfeiture rule, and their common-law
antecedents.1 3 Indeed, Justice Scalia's examination of that history occupies
approximately two thirds of his opinion for the Court. 11 4  Justice Scalia's
conclusion is set out below. 15 In his dissent, Justice Breyer confronted Justice
108. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2680.
109. See infra Part V.
110. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2695 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
111. Id at 2700-01, 2707.
112. Id at 2695.
113. Id at 2682 (majority opinion). "We held in Crawford that the Confrontation Clause is
'most naturally read as a reference to the right of confrontation at common law, admitting only
those exceptions established at the time of the founding."' Id. at 2688 (quoting Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004)).
114. Justice Scalia's opinion in its entirety is 7548 words long (as "counted" by the
WordPerfect word-count application), of which at least 5107 words are devoted directly to a
discussion of historical precedents and authorities, the most recent of which is Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
115. Justice Scalia concluded:
In sum, our interpretation of the common-law forfeiture rule is supported by (1) the
most natural reading of the language used at common law; (2) the absence of common-
law cases admitting prior statements on a forfeiture theory when the defendant had not
engaged in conduct designed to prevent a witness from testifying; (3) the common
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Scalia's historical analysis with an almost equally lengthy rebuttal' 16 that led
Justice Breyer in the opposite direction, although ultimately he concluded that
the historical record was simply too scant to dictate the result.
117
Justice Souter, with whom Justice Ginsburg joined, commented, "I am
convinced that the Court's [Justice Scalia's] historical analysis is sound,"
'" 8
but agreed with Justice Breyer that this history was too thin a basis to be
dispositive, at least in cases involving domestic violence:
The contrast between the Court's and Justice Breyer's careful
examinations of the historical record tells me that the early cases on
the exception were not calibrated finely enough to answer the narrow
question here. The historical record as revealed by the exchange
simply does not focus on what should be required for forfeiture when
the crime charged occurred in an abusive relationship or was its
culminating act; today's understanding of domestic abuse had no
apparent significance at the time of the Framing, and there is no early
xample of the forfeiture rule operating in that circumstance."
9
Declining to rush in where angels fear to tread, 12 and lacking the time and
resources that the attorneys, Justices, and their law clerks devoted to the
question, your humble author eschews any attempt to referee the matter.
12 1
law's uniform exclusion of unconfronted inculpatory testimony by murder victims
(except testimony given with awareness of impending death) in the innumerable cases
in which the defendant was on trial for killing the victim, but was not shown to have
done so for the purpose of preventing testimony; (4) a subsequent history in which the
dissent's broad forfeiture theory has not been applied. The first two and the last are
highly persuasive; the third is in our view conclusive.
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2688.
116. Justice Breyer's dissent totals 8584 words, of which approximately 4424 focused on the
history of the Clause and the forfeiture doctrine.
117. Justice Breyer concluded:
While I have set forth what I believe is the better reading of the common-law cases,
I recognize that different modem judges might read that handful of cases differently.
All the more reason then not to reach firm conclusions about the precise metes and
bounds of a contemporary forfeiture exception by trying to guess the state of mind of
18th century lawyers when they decided not to make a particular argument, i.e.,
forfeiture, in a reported case.
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2707 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 2694 (Souter, J., concurring in part).
119. Id. at 2694-95.
120. Cf Alexander Pope, An Essay on Criticism, in LITERARY CRITICISM OF ALEXANDER
POPE 3, 19 (Bertrand A. Goldgar ed., 1965) (1711).
121. No doubt, lengthy and worthwhile law review articles will be forthcoming on the
subject. For an interesting and concise critique of the historical bases of Justice Scalia's opinion,
see Professor Richard Friedman's blog post, Reflections on Giles, Part 1: History, Dying
Declarations, and Forfeiture, The Confrontation Blog, http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/
(June 29, 2008, 01:39 EST).
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2. "Guilt by a Preponderance" and the Right to Trial by Jury
As noted earlier, California's Supreme Court held in Giles that the
prosecutor could invoke the forfeiture doctrine and introduce the declarant's
testimonial statements simply by proving to the judge, by a preponderance of
the evidence,122 that Giles killed Ms. Avie. Justice Scalia, speaking for a
majority of the Court,' 23 condemned this approach as inconsistent with the
right to a jury trial:
The notion that judges may strip the defendant of a right that the
Constitution deems essential to a fair trial, on the basis of a prior
judicial assessment that the defendant is guilty as charged, does not
sit well with the right to trial by jury. It is akin, one might say, to
"dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously
guilty."
' 124
Justice Scalia added that requiring the prosecutor to establish that the
defendant acted with the intent to prevent the victim's testimony was necessary
to avoid a principle repugnant to our constitutional system of trial by
jury: that those murder defendants whom the judge considers guilty
(after less than a full trial, mind you, and of course before the jury
has pronounced guilt) should be deprived of fair-trial rights, lest they
benefit from their judge-determined wrong.
125
Justices Souter and Ginsburg, concurring, explicitly agreed with Justice
Scalia:
[W]hen a defendant is prosecuted for the very act that causes the
witness's absence, homicide being the extreme example[, i]f the
victim's prior statement were admissible solely because the
defendant kept the witness out of court by committing homicide,
admissibility of the victim's statement to prove guilt would turn on
finding the defendant guilty of the homicidal act causing the absence;
evidence that the defendant killed would come in because the
defendant probably killed. The only thing saving admissibility and
liability determinations from question begging would be (in a jury
case) the distinct functions of judge and jury: judges would find by a
preponderance of evidence that the defendant killed (and so would
admit the testimonial statement), while the jury could so find only on
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Equity demands something more
122. Concerning this burden of proof, see infra Part 1V.G.I.
123. Justice Scalia, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Alito.
124. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2686 (quoting his own opinion in Crawfordv. Washington, 541 U.S.
36, 62 (2004)). Note that this passage appears in Part I-B of Justice Scalia's opinion, with which
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Alito all concurred.
125. Id. at 2691. This language appears in Part II-D-2, which was joined only by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. It is, however, essentially duplicative of the passage in Part JI-
B, quoted immediately previous.
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than this near circularity before the right to confrontation is forfeited,
and more is supplied by showing intent to prevent the witness from
testifying.'
26
Justice Alito, who "join[ed] the Court's opinion,"'127 presumably also agreed
with this reasoning.
The dissent, rejecting this argument, made two basic points. First, Justice
Breyer pointed out that the majority, despite its qualms about relying on the
trial judge's preliminary finding of culpability, nonetheless accepted the
necessity of such a finding in its own approach. 12 Second, Supreme Court
precedent existed for this dual-finding approach. 9  Not surprisingly, the
majority dismissed these arguments.
1 30
As to his first point, Justice Breyer accurately pointed out, "any forfeiture
rule," including the one propounded by Justice Scalia, "requires a judge to
determine as a preliminary matter that the defendant's own wrongdoing caused
the witness to be absent."
'' 3 1
In response, Justice Scalia conceded that such a "preliminary evidentiary
ruling" of guilt is sometimes necessary when, for example, "the defendant is
on trial for murdering a witness in order to prevent his testimony.', 132 The
majority accepted this "exception to ordinary practice," because it was "(1)
needed to protect the integrity of court proceedings, (2) based upon
longstanding precedent, and (3) much less expansive than the exception
proposed by the dissent."'133  Of these three points,134 the one meriting
emphasis here is the third: the dissent's proposal would permit a prosecutor to
invoke the forfeiture exception in order to offer the victim's testimonial
statements whenever the defendant is charged with killing the declarant,
regardless of the motive or purpose for the killing. This approach would
clearly apply in more cases than the one adopted by the majority.
Justice Breyer also rejected the majority's conclusion that his approach to
forfeiture, requiring only a preliminary finding by the judge that the defendant
is guilty, would be the equivalent of "'dispensing with jury trial."" 35 Instead,
126. Id. at 2694 (Souter, J., concurring in part) (agreeing with the Court's forfeiture-by-
wrongdoing analysis).
127. See id! at 2694 (Alito, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 2707-08 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 2707.
130. Id. at 2691 n.6 (majority opinion).
131. Id. at 2707 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing id. at 2693 (majority opinion), where Justice
Scalia acknowledged this necessity).
132. Id. at 2691 (majority opinion).
133. Id.
134. The dissent clearly agreed with Justice Scalia's first point, because the dissent also
emphasized the need to prevent a defendant from profiting by his own wrongdoing in the context
of'judicial proceedings. Id. at 2697 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The disagreement over the historical
record has been discussed briefly in Part III.C. 1, supra.
135. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2707 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 2686 (majority opinion)).
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Justice Breyer pointed out that the Court had adopted just such an approach in
1987 in applying the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule.' 36  In
Bourjaily v. United States, the Court held that to secure admissibility of a
declarant's statement against a non-declarant defendant via the co-conspirator
exception, the prosecutor must persuade the judge by a preponderance of the
evidence that (among other things) a conspiracy existed and that the defendant
was a member of it, both of which are facts the prosecutor must prove to the
jury beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict the defendant of
conspiracy. 137  Justice Scalia dismissed this as insignificant, reasoning that
because co-conspirator statements are non-testimonial,1 38 their admission into
evidence does not raise Confrontation Clause issues in the first place, whereas
a testimonial statement like that in Giles always will raise such issues.' 39 Thus,
unlike Confrontation Clause forfeiture, the co-conspirator exception does not
involve depriving a defendant of a constitutional right based on a mid-trial
judicial finding of guilt.'
4 0
136. Id. (citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76 (1987)). Justice Breyer also
pointed to other legal precedents, arguing that, by analogy, they supported his approach that
intentional killing by itself would suffice to forfeit the protection of the Confrontation Clause.
These include the common-law doctrine that prohibits a life insurance beneficiary who murders
an insured from recovering under the policy regardless of why the beneficiary committed the
crime, and the common-law doctrine that someone who murders a testator cannot inherit under
the will. Id. at 2697.
137. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 174. Bourjaily was charged with conspiring to distribute cocaine
and with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Id. At trial the government, over
Bourjaily's objection, introduced taped phone conversations between his co-conspirator and a
government informant. Id. The Court overruled Bourjaily's Confrontation Clause objection;
upheld the admissibility of the co-conspirator's statements to the informant against Bourjaily per
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), the co-conspirator exception; and spelled out the
procedural requirements of the exception. Id. at 174-76. For a detailed discussion of Bouraily,
see 4 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 25, §§ 27:45-:46 at 555-64 (7th ed. 2000).
138. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2691 n.6. The Court explicitly said as much in Crawford, albeit in
dictum. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2002).
139. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2691 n.6. Justice Scalia acknowledged that this is an after-the-fact
analysis, because, in Bourjaily, the Court addressed the Confrontation Clause issue in the then-
applicable reliability scheme of Ohio v. Roberts. Id.
140. Id. Indeed, in some ways the co-conspirator exception supports, rather than undercuts,
the majority approach in Giles. To invoke that hearsay exception against a defendant charged
with conspiracy, the government must establish to the judge's satisfaction not only the existence
of the conspiracy and the defendant's membership in it-facts necessary to obtain a conviction-
but the government must also persuade the judge of additional facts: (1) that the declarant was
also a member of the conspiracy, (2) the declarant's statement was made during the conspiracy,
and (3) the declarant's statement was made in furtherance of it. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID.
801 (d)(2)(E). These additional facts are not elements of the crime of conspiracy; therefore the
prosecutor need not persuade the jury of these facts, nor even introduce evidence of them.
Similarly, while the Giles majority's approach to the Confrontation Clause forfeiture rule requires
a prosecutor to establish the defendant's guilt to the judge's satisfaction, it, like the co-conspirator
exception, also requires the prosecutor to prove more-that is, that the defendant killed the
declarant with the specific purpose of preventing the declarant from testifying against him. Here,
too, the extra fact that must be proven to the judge-that the defendant's purpose was to prevent
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3. Defining the Requisite Mental State: Intent to Silence
As the previous Part of this Article shows, each of the opinions that together
comprise the Giles majority requires a showing that the defendant acted with
the purpose of preventing the declarant from testifying against him. Justice
Scalia's opinion in Giles used a number of terms to define or describe the
mental state that the prosecutor must prove, including: "conduct designed to
prevent the witness from testifying"; 141 acts done "for the purpose of making a
witness absent"; 142 behavior which prevents a witness from testifying "by the
defendant's means and contrivance";143 conduct done or procured by a
defendant "' in order to prevent [the witness] from giving evidence against
him ;'"144 and acts committed with "specific intent,"14 5 a common-law concept
that requires a prosecutor to prove not only that the defendant intended to
commit a particular act, but that the defendant intended that act to have a
specific result or to achieve a specific purpose. 14 6 Justice Scalia also noted that
in 1997 the Court approved Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), a hearsay
exception entitled "Forfeiture by wrongdoing," which requires a showing that a
litigant "'engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did,
procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.'
147
the victim from testifying against him-is not an element of the crime of murder, and therefore is
not something the law requires the prosecutor to prove to the jury. "[B]ecause ordinarily motive
is not an element of a crime, it is not necessary for the prosecutor to prove either the presence or
absence of a motive." 1 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 89 (15th ed. 1993);
see also I BARBARA E. BERGMAN & NANCY HOLLANDER, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
§ 2:5, at 42 (15th ed. 1997); see also 2 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 47 (2008). But where a prosecutor
has admissible evidence of a defendant's motive, he or she will offer such evidence as a matter of
course. See infra Part IV.G. 1.
141. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2683 (deriving this from his review of the common-law history of
the Confrontation Clause).
142. Id. (citing 12 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 559 (2d ed. 1989)).
143. Id. at 2684 (citing Drayton v. Wells, 10 S.C.L. 409, 411 (S.C. 1819); 1 JOSEPH CHITTY,
A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 81 (1816); S.M. PHILLIPPS, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE 165 (1814)).
144. Id. (quoting EDMUND POWELL, THE PRACTICE OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 166 (1st ed.
1858)).
145. Id. at 2691. Justice Scalia debunked the dissent's approach: "If the forfeiture doctrine
did not admit unconfronted prior testimony at common law, the conclusion must be, not that the
forfeiture doctrine requires no specific intent in order to render unconfronted testimony available,
but that unconfronted testimony is subject to no forfeiture doctrine at all." Id.
146. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.2(a), at 340-41 (2d ed.
2003) (discussing the traditional views of intent).
147. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2687 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6)). Justice Scalia quoted
approvingly an evidence treatise's statement that this language in Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(6) "'means that the exception applies only if the defendant has in mind the particular
purpose of making the witness unavailable."' Id. (quoting 5 C. MUELLER & L. KIRKPATRICK,
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 8:134, at 235 (3d ed. 2007)) (citing 2 KENNETH S. BROWN, MCCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE 176 (6th ed. 2006); 5 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 804.03[7][b], at 804-32 (J. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2008)). Justice Scalia further
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Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, who concurred in this aspect of
Justice Scalia's opinion, expressed the same principle in terms of "intent to
prevent testimony,"'148 "intent to prevent the witness from testifying,"'149 and
"some degree of intent to thwart the judicial process."'150 Each of these phrases
appears to say more or less the same thing. To facilitate discussion, this
Article will sometimes use the phrase "intent to silence" to express the mental
state that the plurality and concurring opinions require. 151
4. Part II-D-2 of Justice Scalia 's Opinion
Justice Souter, writing for himself and Justice Ginsburg, joined "all but Part
II-D-2" of Justice Scalia's opinion. 52 Justice Souter never explained what he
found objectionable to II-D-2, and nothing in his own opinion conflicts overtly
with the contents of Part II-D-2 of Justice Scalia's opinion. So what prompted
Justice Souter's rejection of II-D-2?
In Part II-D-2, Justice Scalia made the following points:
153
1. Justice Scalia insisted that the purposes and objectives of the forfeiture
doctrine are best served by requiring proof that the defendant killed the victim
with the purpose of preventing the victim from testifying against the defendant;
anything less would involve "a principle repugnant to . . . trial by jury," by
requiring a judge to make a mid-trial determination of guilt.f
54
2. Justice Scalia disparaged the dissent's efforts to provide legal precedents
for its view of the forfeiture rule, because none of those precedents and
analogies involve depriving a defendant "of the right to have his guilt in a
criminal proceeding determined by a jury, and on the basis of evidence the
Constitution deems reliable and admissible.' 55
3. Justice Scalia accused the dissent of issuing a "thinly veiled invitation to
overrule Crawford and adopt an approach not much different from the regime
of Ohio v. Roberts, under which the Court would create the exceptions that it
thinks consistent with the policies underlying the confrontation guarantee,
regardless of how that guarantee was historically understood.'
156
noted that the Davis Court described rule 804(b)(6)(a) as a "codifi[cation of] the forfeiture
doctrine." Id. (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006)). Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(b)(6) is discussed further in Part IV.G. I of this Article, infra.
148. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2694 (Souter, J., concurring in part).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 2695.
151. That is, "intent to silence" is offered as a shorthand phrase to mean "intent to prevent the
declarant from testifying against the defendant in a pending or anticipated criminal proceeding."
152. Id. at 2694 (Souter, J., concurring in part).
153. I have altered the sequence somewhat to facilitate discussion.
154. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2691 (plurality opinion).
155. Id. at 2692.
156. Id. at 2691 (citation omitted).
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4. Justice Scalia also maintained that "[t]he larger problem with the dissent's
argument, however, is that the guarantee of confrontation is no guarantee at all
if it is subject to whatever exceptions courts from time to time consider
'fair.""'0 57 Justice Scalia reiterated the basic theory underlying Crawford v.
Washington, that is, that the Court does not have the authority to "extrapolate
from the words of the Sixth Amendment to the values behind it, and then to
enforce its guarantees only to the extent they serve (in the courts' views) those
underlying values"; rather, "[t]he Sixth Amendment seeks fairness indeed-but
seeks it through very specific means (one of which is confrontation) that were
the trial rights of Englishmen."' 58  The Amendment "'does not suggest any
open-ended exceptions from the confrontation requirement to be developed by
the courts. "1
59
So which of these points did Justices Souter and Ginsburg find
objectionable? Probably not points one and two, because Justice Scalia had
made the same points earlier, in Part II-B of his opinion'60-to which Justice
Souter made no objection; and Justice Souter said much the same thing in his
own opinion.
161
Points three and four can be read as doing little more than restating the rule
enunciated in Crawford, that is, that the right to confront and cross-examine
mandates a specific procedural right, for which a court cannot substitute its
own notion of equivalent "fairness. ' 62  Given that Justices Souter and
Ginsburg voted with the majority in Crawford,6 3 Davis,64 and Whorton, 65 it
is unlikely that their rejection of II-D-2 was intended to cast doubts on the
main thrust of the Crawford doctrine.
Professor Roger Kirst suggests that Justice Souter may have objected to
Justice Scalia's "strong rejection" in points three and four "of any role for
policy in interpreting the Confrontation Clause."' 66 As Professor Kirst points
out, Justice Souter found the historical evidence too scant to decide Giles
solely on historical grounds, 167 and ultimately based his rejection of the
dissent's approach (that intent to kill should suffice) on his disapproval of the
157. Id. at 2692.
158. Id.
159. Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004)).
160. See id. at 2684-86.
161. See id. at 2694.
162. See id. at 2682, 2691-92.
163. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 37.
164. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 815 (2006).
165. Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173, 1176 (2007).
166. E-mail from Roger W. Kirst, Henry M. Grether Professor of Law, University of
Nebraska-Lincoln College of Law, to Clifford S. Fishman (Sept. 16, 2008) (on file with the
Catholic University Law Review).
167. See Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2694 (Souter, J., concurring in part) ("The contrast between the
Court's and Justice Breyer's careful examinations of the historical record tells me that the early
cases on the exception were not calibrated finely enough to answer the narrow question here.").
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"circularity" of that approach 68-which suggests a greater willingness to
consider policy in interpreting the Confrontation Clause than Justice Scalia
would allow.
Or perhaps Justice Souter merely objected to something in the tone of Part
II-D-2, but was too polite to specify what.
The only sure conclusion is that the absence of an explicit explanation why
Justice Souter's declination to support Part II-D-2 adds yet another level of
uncertainty to the decision.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE FORFEITURE DOCTRINE IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND
OTHER CASES: THE INTERIM USER'S GUIDE
A. Overview
Three of the Supreme Court's four post-Crawford Confrontation Clause
cases involve allegations that the defendant assaulted or killed a present or
former domestic partner. 169 Unfortunately this is no mere statistical anomaly.
As Justice Breyer set out in his dissenting opinion in Giles:
Each year, domestic violence results in more than 1500 deaths and
more than two million injuries; it accounts for a substantial portion
of all homicides; it typically involves a history of repeated violence;
and it is difficult to prove in court because the victim is generally
reluctant or unable to testify.
170
The Court was well aware that Crawford will often make it more difficult
for a prosecutor to use the complainant's or victim's hearsay statements at the
defendant's trial. Addressing these concerns, Justice Scalia, in Davis,
168. Id. (objecting to the "near circularity" of the dissent's approach, which would base
forfeiture solely on the judge finding the defendant guilty by a preponderance of the evidence).
169. In Davis, the court resolved two cases, each of which involved an assault on a present or
former domestic partner. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 818-20 (2006). In Giles, the
defendant killed his former girlfriend. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2681-82.
The fourth case, Wharton v. Bockting, did not involve an assault on the domestic partner;
instead, the defendant was convicted of sexually molesting his wife's six-year-old daughter. 127
S. Ct. 1173, 1177-78 (2007).
170. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2708-09 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing NEIL WEBSDALE,
UNDERSTANDING DOMESTIC HOMICIDE 207 (1999); DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
COSTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 19 (2003);
Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 751, 768-69 (2005);
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Homicide Trends in the U.S., http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/
tables/relationshiptab.htm). According to the Department of Justice, roughly 3.5 million violent
crimes were committed against family members between 1998 and 2002. Of these 3.5 million
violent crimes, 49% were committed against spouses. "About 22% of murders in 2002 were
family murders. Nearly 9% were murders of a spouse .... Females were 58% of family murder
victims. Of all the murders of females in 2002, family members were responsible for 43%."
MATHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FAMILY VIOLENCE STATISTICS:
INCLUDING STATISTICS ON STRANGERS AND ACQUAINTANCES 1 (2005), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fvs.pdf.
Catholic University Law Review
specifically pointed to the "forfeiture by wrongdoing" rule as a way of dealing
with those difficulties. 171 Moreover, each of the three multi-Justice opinions in
Giles discussed circumstances under which a statement by a non-testifying
declarant-complainant or declarant-victim 172 can, and should, be admitted
over a Confrontation Clause objection. 173 The next several subparts of this
Article examine how these opinions addressed the issue, and the tentative
conclusions that may be drawn.
B. Giles: Justice Scalia's Opinion, Part i-E
Part II-E of Justice Scalia's opinion in Giles makes three main points. First,
Justice Scalia insisted that the Crawford approach to the Confrontation Clause
applies in domestic violence prosecutions, as in all other prosecutions.
174
Second, he emphasized that proof that the defendant acted with the intent to
silence the declarant is necessary to overcome the Confrontation Clause only
when the statement in question is testimonial,175 and, in dictum, suggested a
fairly narrow reading of what statements should be classified as testimonial.
176
Third, he acknowledged that the required intent (to prevent testimony) in
domestic violence cases can sometimes be inferred from the charged act
together with evidence of the defendant and complainant's prior
relationship. 
77
1. Crawford Applies in Domestic Violence Prosecutions
Justice Scalia disparaged what he called the dissent's suggestion that the law
should ignore Crawford in domestic abuse cases:
Is the suggestion that we should have one Confrontation Clause (the
one the Framers adopted and Crawford described) for all other
crimes, but a special, improvised, Confrontation Clause for those
crimes that are frequently directed against women? Domestic
violence is an intolerable offense that legislatures may choose to
combat through many means-from increasing criminal penalties to
adding resources for investigation and prosecution to funding
awareness and prevention campaigns. But for that serious crime, as
171. Davis, 547 U.S. at 833.
172. I use the phrase "declarant-complainant" because the word "victim" presupposes that
the violence has occurred, which may be a contested issue at trial. In cases such as Giles,
however, the only appropriate word is "victim": given that defendant shot and killed her, Ms.
Avie was a homicide "victim" whether or not the jury accepted Giles's mistake-of-fact self-
defense claim. See Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2681.
173. See infra Parts IV.B-D. The prosecutor will, of course, also have to survive a hearsay
objection, a subject covered in Part IV.G, infra.
174. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2692-93.
175. Id at 2692.
176. Id. at 2692-93.
177. Id at 2693.
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for others, abridging the constitutional rights of criminal defendants
is not in the State's arsenal.
17 8
This passage enjoyed a majority of at least five, and perhaps six, Justices.1
7 9
But the dissent actually made no such suggestion; rather, it argued for a
different approach to the forfeiture rule in all cases, not just those involving
domestic violence.
180
2. Dictum as to How "Testimonial" Should Be Defined
In Part II-E of his opinion, Justice Scalia emphasized that the Confrontation
Clause would at most bar "only testimonial statements,"' 81 and added, in
dictum, that "[s]tatements to friends and neighbors about abuse and
intimidation, and statements to physicians in the course of receiving treatment
would be excluded, if at all, only by hearsay rules, which are free to adopt the
dissent's version of forfeiture by wrongdoing."' 182 This dictum, if taken at its
broadest, would significantly limit the definition of "testimonial" and,
therefore, the effect of the Confrontation Clause-and not just in domestic
abuse prosecutions.
Take Justice Scalia's first example. No doubt most "[s]tatements to friends
and neighbors about abuse and intimidation' 183 are non-testimonial. 184  But
suppose the declarant-complainant tells a friend, "D said if I try to leave him
again, he'll kill me. But I just have to go! So if anything happens to me, tell
that to the police!" That certainly seems to qualify as a "'[a] solemn
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving
some fact,"' which is the early nineteenth century definition of testimony that
Justice Scalia cited approvingly in Crawford.
185
178. Id.
179. Justice Scalia, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Souter and Ginsburg explicitly
endorsed this reasoning, as presumably did Justice Alito. See id. at 2694 (Alito, J., concurring)
("I join the Court's opinion ...."). Moreover, although Justice Thomas has a much narrower
view of "testimonial" than these first five Justices named in this note, he has never suggested that
a different standard should apply in domestic violence cases than in other cases. The opinions of
Justices Thomas and Alito are discussed in Part V, infra.
180. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2701, 2709 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 2692 (majority opinion).
182. Id. at 2692-93.
183. Id at 2692-93.
184. At present, most such statements probably do not fall within any of the traditional
hearsay exceptions either; but as Justice Scalia pointed out in Giles, Congress or the states are
free to craft a new exception, or broaden an existing exception, to include such a statement
without running afoul of the Confrontation Clause, so long as the statement itself is not
testimonial. See id at 2686-87, 2688 n.2. See infra Part 1V.G for a discussion of hearsay
exceptions on which a prosecutor might rely.
185. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (quoting 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN
AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)); see also supra notes 57-58 and
accompanying text.
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Justice Scalia's second example-"statements to physicians in the course of
receiving treatment" 86-also sweeps broadly enough to incorporate statements
that otherwise could be considered testimonial. Suppose a woman tells her
doctor: "See what my boyfriend did to me? I want you to write up every cut,
every bruise, every contusion, so the prosecutor will have lots of evidence
when I take the #!#$@% to trial!" '  Would that not be a "solemn
declaration," or, at least, a statement "that w[as] made under circumstances
which would lead to an objective witness reasonably to believe that [it] would
be available for use at a later trial?"'
' 88
If Justice Scalia and those who joined his opinion intended the Giles dictum
quoted at the beginning of this subsection to be taken at full face value, this
suggests a very narrow definition of testimonial--one limited, perhaps, solely
to statements made by, or to, the police (and 911 operators acting as their
agents, as in Davis), and, perhaps, to other government agents and officials, but
never statements made to those unaffiliated with the government. Unless and
until the Court grants certiorari on a case involving arguably testimonial
statements to a witness with no government affiliation, however, judges,
attorneys, and scholars can only speculate on such matters.
3. Inferring the Requisite Intent
Third, in Part II-E of his opinion, Justice Scalia insisted that a prosecutor
should often be able to satisfy the purpose-based forfeiture doctrine:
Acts of domestic violence often are intended to dissuade a victim
from resorting to outside help, and include conduct designed to
prevent testimony to police officers or cooperation in criminal
prosecutions. Where such an abusive relationship culminates in
murder, the evidence may support a finding that the crime expressed
the intent to isolate the victim and to stop her from reporting abuse to
the authorities or cooperating with a criminal prosecution-rendering
her prior statements admissible under the forfeiture doctrine. Earlier
abuse, or threats of abuse, intended to dissuade the victim from
resorting to outside help would be highly relevant to this inquiry, as
would evidence of ongoing criminal proceedings at which the victim
would have been expected to testify. 89
The first two sentences of this passage can be read broadly to suggest that
evidence of a prior abusive relationship might suffice to establish that the
homicidal act was committed with the intent to silence the victim. The last two
186. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2693.
187. Or picture a doctor treating a battered woman, telling her, "I am required by law to
report all cases of probable domestic assault. Tell me who did this to you," in response to which,
the woman then identifies her attacker.
188. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52 (citing this as one of several possible definitions of
"testimonial"); see also supra Part l.C.
189. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2693.
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sentences of the passage, however, appear to allow the inference only in cases
in which the prosecutor can prove either: (a) "[e]arlier abuse, or threats of
abuse, intended to dissuade the victim from resorting to outside help," or (b)
"ongoing criminal proceedings at which the victim would have been expected
to testify."190
C. Giles: The Souter-Ginsburg Concurring Opinion
In his concurring opinion, Justice Souter, with whom Justice Ginsburg
concurred, explicitly endorsed Justice Scalia's Part II-E discussion of the
operation of the Confrontation Clause in domestic violence cases, 191 but added
his own thoughts as to how the requisite intent might be shown:
[T]he element of intention would normally be satisfied by the intent
inferred on the part of the domestic abuser in the classic abusive
relationship, which is meant to isolate the victim from outside help,
including the aid of law enforcement and the judicial process. If the
evidence for admissibility shows a continuing relationship of this
sort, it would make no sense to suggest that the oppressing defendant
miraculously abandoned the dynamics of abuse the instant before he
killed his victim, say in a fit of anger.
192
Thus, while Justice Souter, like Justice Scalia, rejected the dissent's position
(that to trigger the forfeiture rule it should suffice to show that the defendant
knew his conduct would prevent the complainant-declarant from testifying),
his opinion explicitly stated that intent could be inferred from such knowledge
in many domestic violence cases-including, perhaps, cases in which the
prosecutor lacks what Part II-E of Justice Scalia's opinion seems to require,
that is, evidence of "[e]arlier abuse, or threats of abuse, intended to dissuade
the victim from resorting to outside help," or evidence that the defendant
already faced criminal charges and that the victim was expected to testify
against him.' 9 3 As Parts IV.D and IV.E of this Article demonstrate, this
apparently broader view actually captured a majority of the Court.
D. The Giles Dissent
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and Kennedy, urged that the
prosecutor should be required to prove only that the defendant knew, when he
killed the victim, that doing so would prevent her from testifying in any
existing or potential future court proceeding.1 94 His dissent further argued that
190. Id.
191. Id. at 2695 (Souter, J., concurring in part). See supra Part IV.B.
192. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2695. Justice Souter concluded this passage, and his concurring
opinion, by adding, "[t]he Court's conclusion in Part II-E thus fits the rationale that equity
requires and the historical record supports." Id.
193. Id. at 2693 (majority opinion) (Part lI-E). See supra Part IV.B.3.
194. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2697-98 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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if intent was required, Giles's very act of killing Ms. Avie demonstrated such
intent:
[U]nder the circumstances presented by this case, there is no
difficulty demonstrating the defendant's intent. This is because the
defendant here knew that murdering his ex-girifriend would keep her
from testifying; and that knowledge is sufficient to show the intent
that law ordinarily demands. As this Court put the matter more than a
century ago: A "'man who performs an act which it is known will
produce a particular result is from our common experience presumed
to have anticipated that result and to have intended it."
' 195
Later in the dissent, Justice Breyer described this concept as "knowledge-based
intent."
196
Justice Scalia explicitly rejected this view, insisting that satisfying the
forfeiture doctrine required more than mere knowledge from which intent
could automatically be inferred. 197 Justice Breyer protested on the grounds
that this would give the defendant an unfair evidentiary advantage: "At his
murder trial, the defendant testified that he had acted in self-defense. To
support that assertion, he described the victim as jealous, vindictive,
aggressive, and violent."'198 The Court's ruling, Justice Breyer predicted, might
mean that the prosecutor could not impeach this testimony with evidence that,
three weeks earlier, Ms. Avie, "crying as she spoke, told a police officer how
her former boyfriend (now, the defendant) had choked her, 'opened a folding
knife,' and 'threatened to kill her." ' 199 Such a result, Justice Breyer insisted,
was a grave injustice. 200 Still, he suggested that his view had suffered no more
195. Id at 2697-98 (quoting Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 496 (1896)) (citing United
States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 613 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he jury is entitled to
presume that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts." (alteration in
original)); GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW § 18, at 38 (2d ed. 1961) ("There is one
situation where a consequence is deemed to be intended though it is not desired. This is where it
is foreseen as substantially certain."); ALl, MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b)(ii) (1962) (a person
acts "knowingly" if "the element involves a result of his conduct" and "he is aware that it is
practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result")).
196. Id. at 2708.
197. Id. at 2693 (majority opinion) (quoting id. at 2708 (Breyer, J., dissenting)) (rejecting
that approach, however). Concerning the kind of evidence that might satisfy the prosecutor's
burden, see infra Part IV.G. 1.
198. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2695 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
199. Id. (quoting the Court's statement of the facts). The state prosecutor did introduce the
victim's statement. Id. The Supreme Court held that, assuming (as the state conceded) that the
statement was testimonial, the state could not invoke the forfeiture doctrine and introduce her
statement simply by proving to the judge's satisfaction that the defendant killed her. 1d. at 2693
(majority opinion). Instead, the Court remanded to give the state the opportunity attempt to meet
the more demanding intent-to-silence standard. Id.
200. Id. at 2709 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Whether or not Ms. Avie's statements to the officer
were inadmissible, the prosecutor could challenge Giles's portrayal of her in other ways. Once a
homicide defendant puts a victim's character in issue, the prosecutor is entitled to offer evidence
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than a nominal defeat. Referring to Part II-E of Justice Scalia's opinion,
Justice Breyer observed:
Even the majority appears to recognize the problem with its
"purpose" requirement, for it ends its opinion by creating a kind of
presumption that will transform purpose into knowledge-based
intent-at least where domestic violence is at issue; and that is the
201area where the problem is most likely to arise.
Justice Breyer then quoted and endorsed the closing paragraph of Justice
Souter's concurring opinion, set forth in Part IV.C, and concluded:
This seems to say that a showing of domestic abuse is sufficient to
call into play the protection of the forfeiture rule in a trial for murder
of the domestic abuse victim. Doing so when, in fact, the abuser
may have had other matters in mind apart from preventing the
witness from testifying, is in effect not to insist upon a showing of
"purpose." Consequently, I agree with this formulation, though I
202would apply a simple intent requirement across the board.
E. Evaluation and Summary
To the extent that Justice Souter's concurrence differs from Justice Scalia's
plurality opinion, it is Justice Souter's approach, rather than Justice Scalia's,
that captured a majority of the Court on this issue.203 It is important, therefore,
to focus on what Justice Souter wrote, rather than Justice Breyer's description
of it, because Justice Breyer overstates matters somewhat. Under Justice
Souter's view, it would not suffice for the prosecutor to show that the
204
defendant intentionally killed his current or former wife or girlfriend.
Moreover, Justice Souter's concurrence requires more than what Justice Breyer
called "a showing of domestic abuse":20 5 it would not suffice to prove that the
defendant had previously assaulted or threatened the victim. Rather, to
establish the "inferred intent" to prevent the declarant or victim from
of the victim's non-violent, peaceful character. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2). Section 1103
of the California Evidence Code is similar. See generally 3 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note
25, §§ 16:47-:59 at 216-38 (7th ed. 1998 & Supp. 2008).
201. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2708 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's majority opinion
rejected Justice Breyer's reading of Part Il-E of the Court's opinion. Id. at 2693 (majority
opinion); see also supra Part IV.B.
202. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2708 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
203. Justice Souter's concurring opinion was co-signed by Justice Ginsburg. Id. at 2694
(Souter, J., concurring in part). Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion, which embraced Justice
Souter's approach, was co-signed by Justices Stevens and Kennedy. Id. at 2695, 2708 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
204. See id. at 2694-95 (Souter, J., concurring in part) (stating that to admit an unconfronted
testimonial statement on the mere showing that the defendant killed the victim-declarant would
amount to near circularity and that "[e]quity demands something more ... and more is supplied
by showing intent to prevent the witness from testifying").
205. Id. at 2708 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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testifying, Justice Souter would require the prosecutor to establish to the
judge's satisfaction that the defendant imposed on the victim or complainant
"the classic abusive relationship, which is meant to isolate the victim from
outside help, including the aid of law enforcement and the judicial process."
20 6
What this means, and how a prosecutor may endeavor to show it, are discussed
next.
F. Procedure: Means of Proof
1. Homicide Prosecutions
Requiring a prosecutor to prove to the judge that the defendant intended to
prevent the declarant from testifying will not always impose an additional
burden. Where, for example, the defendant is charged with killing a witness
who was scheduled to testify against him in an upcoming trial, the prosecutor
will offer evidence of that motive to the jury as well as to the judge. This is
so because showing that the defendant had a motive to kill the victim is often
useful to prove (a) that the defendant was in fact the killer,20 8 and (b) that the
defendant acted with a particular mens rea (intentionally, with malice, with
deliberation, etc.).
But where there is no direct evidence tying the killing to an already pending
or potential case (as often happens in domestic homicides), establishing a
testimony-preventing motive obviously imposes an additional burden on the
prosecutor, will often involve evidence that a jury will not hear, and in fact
may not be provable to the jury at all. This part of the Article addresses when
and how this issue should be litigated.
A defendant is charged with murdering V. The prosecutor plans to offer into
evidence one or more statements V made, accusing the defendant of
committing prior assaults, of making threats to kill V, or acting in some other
way that tends to establish the defendant's guilt.209 The situation could arise inconnection with a variety of domestic relationships 210 and in situations
206. Id. at 2695 (Souter, J., concurring in part).
207. The same is true where a defendant is accused of killing someone (or having him killed)
because the defendant believed the victim was cooperating with the authorities and therefore
might someday testify, even though no charges were yet pending.
208. As a general rule, of course, a prosecutor in a murder trial will offer evidence of motive
whenever possible, because, particularly when the identity of the perpetrator is an issue, juries are
often reluctant to convict if the prosecutor cannot show the defendant had a plausible motive.
209. The following discussion presupposes that the defendant has not previously had an
adequate opportunity to confront and cross-examine V about the statements. If the defendant had
such an opportunity, the state could offer the prior statements under the hearsay exception for
former testimony, see FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1), and if those opportunities were constitutionally
adequate there would be no Confrontation Clause basis to exclude them, either. See 4 FISHMAN
& MCKENNA, supra note 25, § 25A:39 at 155-58 (Supp. 2008).
210. The occasional case may arise where the woman, not the man, is the abusive partner; or
where an adult child is accused of abusing a dependant parent or sibling; and may arise in
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unconnected to domestic matters. 21' But it probably arises most often in cases
where a man is accused of murdering his current or former wife or girlfriend.
As that is the setting before the Supreme Court in Giles v. California,2 so that
is the factual setting used for this discussion.
The defense can move to exclude such statements only if it knows the
statements exist. Therefore, a defendant should seek information as to the
existence and contents of such statements in its pretrial motion for
discovery.
2 13
Once the defendant knows that the prosecutor contemplates offering such
statements into evidence, the question arises: when should the admissibility of
the statements be litigated? The parties could, of course, wait until after the
trial has begun to litigate the admissibility of V's unconfronted statements. To
do so, however, might require mid-trial interruptions and could result in a
mistrial if the jury has already heard evidence of such statements that the judge
214later concludes is inadmissible and unduly prejudicial. It is far better for the
attorneys to know in advance whether the statements are admissible. Such
knowledge might influence the plea bargaining posture of each and, if the case
does go to trial, it would affect the attorneys' trial strategies, from opening
statements onward. Thus, the better practice is for either the defendant or the
prosecutor to move in limine to determine the admissibility of these
statements; the trial court could also raise the issue sua sponte.
Once the matter is raised, the trial judge should convene a hearing (either
prior to trial or, if mid-trial, out of the jury's hearing). At this hearing, because
it is the defendant who seeks to invoke the Confrontation Clause, the burden
should be on the defense to establish that the statements in question are
testimonial.21 5  If the defense succeeds, the burden is on the prosecutor to
establish that the defendant forfeited his Confrontation Clause rights by
wrongdoing.
21 6
homosexual as well as heterosexual relationships. See Sarah M. Buel, Effective Assistance of
Counsel for Battered Women Defendants: A Normative Construct, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 217,
219 & nf. 12-13 (2003) (noting that women often abuse men and domestic violence can occur in
same-sex relationships); see also Bonnie Brandl & Deborah L. Horan, Domestic Violence in Later
Life: An Overview for Health Care Providers, 35 WOMEN & HEALTH 41, 41 (2002) (observing
that frequently an abuser is an adult child).
211. Assume, for example, V has complained to the police on several occasions that he was
threatened by his next door neighbor, or by his business competitor, or by his rival for the
affections of a young woman, or by an organized crime figure who demands "protection" money.
212. Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2681-82 (2008).
213. See 5 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE §
8:134, at 241 (3d ed. 2007).
214. See id § 8:134, at238-39.
215. As a rule, the party seeking to invoke a rule, or an exception to a rule, has the burden of
establishing that it applies to the case. See John Robert Knoebber, Say That to My Face:
Applying an Objective Approach to Determine the Meaning of Testimony in Light ofCrawford v.
Washington, 51 LOY. L. REV. 497, 541 (2005) (advocating a burden-shifting approach).
216. Id.
Catholic University Law Review
At the hearing, the prosecutor should offer any available evidence that the
defendant had assaulted or threatened the victim on prior occasions. This
includes evidence that would not be admissible at trial.217  Such evidence
might include: (1) witnesses who observed prior arguments and threats; (2)
witnesses to whom the victim made previous hearsay statements (whether
testimonial or not) in which the victim recounted the defendant's various
threats and acts of abuse during the course of the relationship; (3) prior
instances in which the police responded to reports of domestic violence; (4)
evidence of the victim's or complainant's prior injuries, such as testimony by
witnesses who noticed her bruises, hospital records documenting injuries, and
so on.
The prosecutor should offer any evidence tending to show that on prior
occasions the defendant prevented the victim from going to the authorities, or
warned her not to, or punished her for doing so. In the absence of such direct
evidence, or in addition to it, the prosecutor may offer expert testimony as to
the components of the "classic abusive relationship, which is meant to isolate
the victim from outside help, including the aid of law enforcement and the
judicial process." 218 The defense, of course, can impeach, challenge and rebut
this evidence.
217. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 104(a) ("Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary
questions concerning ... the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court .... In
making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to
privileges."). Rule 104(a) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence is substantively identical. See UNIF.
R. EVID. 104(a). In Davis v. Washington, the Supreme Court, while carefully noting that it was
not deciding matters of proof, quoted approvingly the conclusion of Massachusetts' highest court
in Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 172 (Mass. 2005), that if a hearing on forfeiture
is required, "hearsay evidence, including the unavailable witness's out-of-court statements, may
be considered." Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2007).
218. Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2695 (2008) (Souter, J., concurring in part). In
essence, the battered woman syndrome (BWS) describes a relationship in which the man has
subjected the woman to several cycles of emotional and physical abuse, as a result of which the
abuse victim develops a sense of helplessness that interferes with her ability to seek help or
terminate the relationship. See FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 25, §§ 41:10-:18 at 269-304
(App'x of New Chs. 2008). The admissibility of expert testimony relating to BWS first arose in
cases where the allegedly battered woman was on trial for murdering the alleged batterer: defense
counsel sought to use such testimony to explain to the jury why, if the relationship was as
gruesome as the defendant claimed, she did not either report the deceased to the authorities or
leave him. Prosecutors quickly realized that such evidence could be helpful in prosecutions of the
man for battering the woman, to explain why the complainant did not immediately report the
prior assaults, or why she recanted one or more complaints, or continued or returned to live with
the batterer after the prior or charged assault. Id. § 41:10 at 270, § 41:12 at 282. Some
jurisdictions exclude such evidence altogether; some permit the expert to explain the syndrome in
general terms, without specifically addressing the case at hand; and some permit the expert to
express an opinion as to whether the relationship in the case in fact fit within the BWS pattern.
For a detailed discussion of such evidence and its admissibility at trial, see id § 41:10 at 271-77
and Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call to
Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 998-1004 (2004). Even in
jurisdictions that exclude such evidence at trial, however, a judge could legitimately consider it in
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At the end of the hearing, after each side rests, the judge decides whether the
prosecutor has established (presumably, by a preponderance of the evidence)
2 19
that, as Justice Souter stated in his concurring opinion in Giles, the defendant
and victim had "a continuing relationship of this sort." 220 If so, "it would make
no sense to suggest that the oppressing defendant miraculously abandoned the
dynamics of abuse the instant before he killed his victim, say in a fit of
anger. ' ' 221  Justice Souter's concurring opinion, coupled with the dissent's
endorsement of it, clearly establishes that such evidence would suffice to
permit the judge to infer, by a preponderance of the evidence, that when the
defendant killed the victim, his purpose, at least in part, was to prevent her
from complaining to the authorities and testifying against him; and therefore,
that the defendant has forfeited his right to raise a Confrontation Clause
212objection.
2. Assault Prosecutions
a. Where the Complainant Refuses to Testify
Where the complainant or victim is still alive but refuses to testify against
the defendant, 22 3 the same procedure, same proof, and same permissible
inference of intent outlined in the previous section would apply: at a hearing,
pretrial or out of the jury's presence, the prosecutor would have to offer
evidence that persuades the judge by a preponderance of the evidence that the
assessing the admissibility of other evidence. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 104(a), discussed in note
217, supra.
219. The Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6) explicitly
endorses this burden of persuasion with regard to the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing hearsay
exception. See FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee's note; infra note 230 and accompanying
text. The Supreme Court has not explicitly ruled on the prosecutor's burden of persuasion at the
hearing for Confrontation Clause purposes, but in Davis, it noted approvingly that lower federal
and state courts, in applying the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing hearsay exception, have required the
prosecutor to prove the foundational facts by a preponderance of the evidence. Davis, 547 U.S. at
833.
220. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2695 (Souter, J., concurring in part).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 2694-95. Keep in mind that to secure the admission of the victim's statements at
trial, the prosecutor would also have to overcome a hearsay objection, either via a forfeiture-by-
wrongdoing hearsay exception or some other exception. For a brief discussion of the hearsay
issue, see infra Part IV.G.
223. If the defendant and complainant are married, the complainant can lawfully refuse to
testify by invoking the spousal testimonial privilege, which entitles one spouse to refuse to testify
against the other in a criminal case. See generally FIsHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 25, § 44:2-
:7 at 669-80 (App'x of New Chs. 2008). If they are not married, the complainant may simply
refuse to testify even when threatened with contempt of court. Or the complainant may absent
herself from the jurisdiction, effectively avoiding a subpoena to testify.
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defendant engaged in misconduct with the purpose of dissuading the
complainant from testifying, which in fact had that effect.
2 24
b. Where the Complainant Testifies but Recants
Where the complainant testifies but recants (that is, testifies that the
defendant did not assault her), the defendant can raise no Confrontation Clause
objection: the very fact that the complainant testifies provides the defendant
225with the opportunity to confront and direct- or cross-examine her.  Therefore
the admissibility of her prior statements, whether testimonial or not, raise no
constitutional questions; the only issues are whether the statements are
admissible over a hearsay objection, either under a hearsay exception as
substantive evidence, or for the limited purpose of impeaching her inconsistent
trial testimony.
2 26
G. Overcoming the Hearsay Exception
Even if the prosecutor can overcome the defendant's Confrontation Clause
objection to the complainant's statements, those statements will still be
excluded unless they fall within a hearsay exception. 227 This Part will briefly
discuss some of the exceptions most likely to apply.
1. The Forfeiture-by- Wrongdoing Exception
As originally enacted in 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence did not include
a hearsay exception incorporating the forfeiture doctrine. In 1997, however,
the judicial conference and Supreme Court approved a new provision to
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b):22 8 "Forfeiture by wrongdoing. A statement
224. Indeed, this in essence is what occurred in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1879), the Court's first forfeiture-by-wrongdoing decision, where, after hearing testimony that
suggested the defendant had kept his wife away from home so that she could not be subpoenaed
to testify at his bigamy trial, the trial court permitted the government to introduce testimony that
the defendant's wife had given at the defendant's prior trial, id. at 158-61.
225. If the declarant recants her accusation, the odds are that the defendant would have no
interest in impeaching the declarant's recantation; but the defendant has the opportunity to
question the declarant about why she made the accusation in the first place, whether the
government made any promises or threats to induce her to do so, and so on.
226. Concerning prior inconsistent statements generally, see 4 FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra
note 25, §§ 26:2-:31 at 309-78 (7th ed. 2000 & Supp. 2008).
227. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 802 ("Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these
rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act
of Congress.").
228. Its placement in Rule 804 was logical enough. That rule sets forth hearsay exceptions
that a party may use only after first establishing that the declarant is unavailable to testify,
unavailability being defined in Rule 804(a):
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in
which the declarant-
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying
concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or
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offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was
intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a
,,229witness.
The rule explicitly requires the offering party to prove that the adverse party
acted with the intent of preventing the declarant from testifying. The Advisory
Committee Note adds only that the party seeking to invoke the exception must
establish its requirements by a preponderance of the evidence.23 °
In Giles, Justice Scalia suggested that the present wording of this exception
"codifies" the forfeiture exception to the Confrontation Clause.231  Thus, no
questions exist as to its constitutionality. Other jurisdictions have enacted or
232promulgated similar forfeiture provisions .
This hearsay exception is sound public policy, and has applications in a
variety of contexts, civil and criminal, beyond domestic violence situations.
Jurisdictions that have not yet enacted such a provision should do so. Because
some have not, however, it is worth considering other hearsay exceptions that,
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the declarant's
statement despite an order of the court to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's
statement; or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then
existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of statement has been unable
to procure the declarant's attendance (or in the case of a hearsay exception under
subdivision (b)(2), (3), or (4), the declarant's attendance or testimony) by process
or other reasonable means.
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if exemption, refusal, claim of lack of
memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the
proponent of a statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or
testifying.
FED. R. EVID. 804(a).
229. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6). Note that this exception applies in civil as well as criminal
cases.
230. FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee's note. In 1997, Rule 804(b)(6), a provision
identical to the federal rule, was added to the Uniform Rules of Evidence. The Uniform Rules of
Evidence were amended in 1974 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws as a state-court code of evidence similar to the Federal Rules of Evidence, which were
adopted in 1975. See Eileen A. Scallen, Proceeding with Caution: Making and Amending the
FederalRules of Evidence, 36 Sw. U. L. REV. 601, 605 (2008).
231. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
232. Since 1997, twelve states have added a corresponding provision to their own evidence
codes. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1350 (West 2009); DEL. R. EVID. 804(b)(6); HAW. R. EVID.
804(b)(7); KY. R. EVID. 804(b)(5); MD. CODE ANN., EVID. § 5-804(b)(5) (LexisNexis 2008);
MICH. R. EVID. 804(b)(6); N.D. R. EVID. 804(b)(6); OHIO R. EVID. 804(b)(6); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40.465 (West Supp. 2008); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 804(B)(6) (West 1999); TENN. R.
EVID. 804(b)(6); VT. R. EVID. 804(b)(6). At least eleven others have adopted the exception
through case law. See Anthony Bocchino & David Sonenshein, Rule 804(b)(6)-The Illegitimate
Child of the Failed Liaison Between the Hearsay Rule and Confrontation Clause, 73 MO. L. REV.
41, 79-80 (2008).
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under appropriate circumstances, would secure admissibility of the declarant's
statements over a hearsay objection.
2. Excited Utterance
The excited utterance hearsay exception, found at Federal Rule of Evidence
803(2) and many corresponding state provisions,233 provides: "The following
are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a
witness: ... (2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused
by the event or condition."
234
To qualify a statement for admission under this exception, the offering party
need not show that the declarant is unavailable, nor call the declarant as a
witness,235 but must satisfy the judge of the following facts236 by a
preponderance of the evidence:
1. The declarant witnessed or experienced a "startling event or condition.,
237
2. The statement "relat[es] to" the event or condition.
238
3. The event or condition caused the declarant "stress" and "excitement." 239
4. "[T]he declarant's condition at the time was such that the statement was
spontaneous, excited or impulsive rather than the product of reflection and
deliberation.,
240
In domestic violence cases, the first three requirements will generally cause
little difficulty: being assaulted or threatened clearly qualifies as "a startling
event or condition" that will cause "stress" and "excitement," and the
233. See 4 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 25, §§ 28:10-:11 at 624-29 (7th ed. 2000), for
a discussion of how each state treats such statements.
234. FED. R. EvID. 803(2).
235. Rule 803 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is entitled "Hearsay Exceptions; Availability
of the Declarant Immaterial," and the rule's introductory sentence repeats this. Normally, of
course, to satisfy the Confrontation Clause, the prosecutor must, among other things, either call
the declarant as a witness or establish the declarant's unavailability. See Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42-45 (2004). But if the prosecutor can satisfy the forfeiture doctrine,
the defendant is not entitled to make a Confrontation Clause objection. See supra Part lID.
236. See 4 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 25, § 28:9 at 621-22 (7th ed. 2000 & Supp.
2008).
237. FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
238. Id
239. Id
240. Dike v. State, 990 P.3d 1012, 1021 (Wyo. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting LP v. Natrona County Dep't of Pub. Assistance & Social Servs., 679 P.2d 976, 1003
(Wyo. 1984)); see also Luedemann v. Wade, 913 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Ark. 1996); People v.
Farmer, 765 P.2d 940, 948-49 (Cal. 1989); Reyes-Contreras v. United States, 719 A.2d 503, 506
(D.C. 1998); Walthour v. State, 497 S.E.2d 799, 801 (Ga. 1998); People v. Thomas, 687 N.E.2d
892, 902 (111. 1997); Commonwealth v. Whelton, 696 N.E.2d 540, 544 (Mass. 1998); State v.
Post, 901 S.W.2d 231, 234 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); People v. Vasquez, 670 N.E.2d 1328, 1334
(N.Y. 1996); State v. Duncan, 373 N.E.2d 1234, 1237 (Ohio 1978); State v. Smith, 857 S.W.2d 1,
9 (Tenn. 1993).
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statement usually identifies the defendant as the assailant, which "relates" to
the assault or threat. 241  The fourth requirement will often pose problems
depending on a variety of factors, the main ones being the amount of time that
elapsed between the assault and the declarant's statement; 242 whether the
jurisdiction in question takes a narrow or expansive view of how much or how
little time it would likely take before the declarant regained her ability to
reflect and deliberate; 243 whether, if the statement was made in response to a
question, it is nevertheless spontaneous enough; 244 and, in some jurisdictions,
whether the statement is self-serving or the declarant had a motive to lie.
245
3. Prior Inconsistent Statements
When a witness testifies to a certain fact or version of events, the adverse
party is permitted to impeach that testimony by introducing evidence that the
witness had previously made statements that are inconsistent with the
246testimony. Thus, in a domestic violence prosecution, if the complainant
recants her original allegations against the defendant when she testifies at trial,
the prosecutor is permitted to cross-examine her about her prior statements
accusing the defendant of assault, and if she denies having made those
statements, can elicit testimony about her statements from the police officer or
other person to whom she made them. 247 But if the prior statement is admitted
only to impeach the trial testimony, the trial judge, if requested by the
defendant, must instruct the jury that it cannot consider the statement as
evidence of the defendant's guilt, but can only use it to evaluate the weight it- • •248
should give to the erstwhile complainant's exculpatory evidence at trial.
Of greater import is that, if the statement is admitted only to impeach the
complainant's trial testimony, the judge is not permitted to consider it when
ruling on the defendant's motion for a directed verdict at the close of the
241. See 4 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 25, § 28:12 at 629-34 (7th ed. & Supp. 2008).
242. 4 id § 28:14, at 638-39.
243. See, for example, United States v. Arnold, 410 F.3d 895 (6th Cir. 2005), State v. Branch,
865 A.2d 673, 685 (N.J. 2005), and State v. Cotto, 865 A.2d 660, 668 (N.J. 2005), each requiring
the state to establish the time period and imposing fairly strict limits-measured in seconds or, at
the most, a few minutes.
244. That a statement was made in response to a question weighs against the statement's
spontaneity, although it is not necessarily a disqualifying factor. See 4 FISHMAN & MCKENNA,
supra note 25, § 28:18 at 649 (7th ed. & Supp. 2008).
245. 4id. §28:13, at636-38.
246. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 613. Impeachment of this kind poses an impressively complex
variety of procedural and tactical issues. See 4 FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 25, §§ 26:10-
:29 at 335-74 (7th ed. & Supp. 2008).
247. See 4 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 25, §§ 26:17-:25 at 345-63 (7th ed. 2000 &
Supp. 2008).
248. See 4 id. § 26:26, at 363.
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state's case and after both sides rest. 249 If the prosecutor lacks other credible
evidence that the defendant assaulted the complainant, the judge must grant the
250motion and dismiss the case.
Many jurisdictions have created a hearsay exception that admits some prior
inconsistent statements as substantive evidence. That is, the exception
permits the statement to be used not merely to impeach the witness's trial
testimony, but also as evidence of the facts asserted in the statement. If the
prior statement falls within such an exception, the judge may consider it in
ruling on the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. Moreover, the judge
need not give a limiting instruction to the jury.
252
Some states follow the model of Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and allow
substantive use of a prior inconsistent statement only if that prior statement
was made under oath at a formal proceeding of some kind, such as a
preliminary hearing or before a grand jury. 253 Other states permit a wider
range of prior inconsistent statements to be used as substantive evidence.254
4. Other Specialized Exceptions: California Evidence Code Section 13 70
Some states have enacted special hearsay exceptions for statements relating
to domestic violence, child molestation, sexual assault, and similar abuses.
25
A detailed discussion of all such exceptions is beyond the scope of this Article.
It is, however, worthwhile to consider the California exception on which the
prosecutor relied in Giles.
Ms. Avie's statement to Officer Kotsinadelis was admitted at Giles's
California trial pursuant to California Evidence Code Section 1370:
(a) Evidence of a statement by a declarant is not made
inadmissible by the hearsay rule if all of the following conditions are
met:
249. As a matter of routine, defense counsel should move for a directed verdict (also
sometimes called a motion for a judgment of acquittal) at those two stages in a criminal trial. The
trial judge must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecutor and assess whether a
rational jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. If the judge concludes
that a rational jury could convict, the defendant's motion is denied, and the case proceeds to the
next stage. See generally 1 FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 25, §§ 5:14-:17 at 446-52 (7th
ed. 1992 & Supp. 2008).
250. See lid. § 5:15, at 447-48 & n.86 (7th ed. 1992).
251. See 4 id §§ 26:4-:6, at 312-31 (7th ed. 2000 & Supp. 2008).
252. See 4 id. § 26:26, at 363-64.
253. See 4 id. §§ 26:3-:4, at 311-24.
254. See 4 id. §§ 26:30-:32, at 375-79. The federal approach is unfortunate: it gives an
unfair advantage to the litigant who can threaten, bribe, or seduce a witness into recanting.
Permitting a witness-declarant's prior inconsistent statement to be used substantively and not
merely to impeach substantially undoes this unfair advantage and permits the jury to decide
whether it finds the witness's testimony, or her prior statement, more likely to be truthful.
255. See4id. §§31:1-:8, at757-77.
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(1) The statement purports to narrate, describe, or explain the
infliction or threat of physical injury upon the declarant.
(2) The declarant is unavailable as a witness pursuant to Section
240.
(3) The statement was made at or near the time of the infliction or
threat of physical injury. Evidence of statements made more than
five years before the filing of the current action or proceeding shall
be inadmissible under this section.
(4) The statement was made under circumstances that would
indicate its trustworthiness.
(5) The statement was made in writing, was electronically
recorded, or made to a physician, nurse, paramedic, or to a law
enforcement official.
(b) For purposes of paragraph (4) of subdivision (a),
circumstances relevant to the issue of trustworthiness include, but are
not limited to, the following:
(1) Whether the statement was made in contemplation of pending
or anticipated litigation in which the declarant was interested.
(2) Whether the declarant has a bias or motive for fabricating the
statement, and the extent of any bias or motive.
(3) Whether the statement is corroborated by evidence other than
statements that are admissible only pursuant to this section.
(c) A statement is admissible pursuant to this section only if the
proponent of the statement makes known to the adverse party the
intention to offer the statement and the particulars of the statement
sufficiently in advance of the proceedings in order to provide the
adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet the
statement.
256
It is worthwhile to compare this rule with Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(6), which it resembles in some respects. First, the declarant must be
257unavailable. Second, that unavailability must have been caused by the
defendant's wrongdoing. 258 The California rule is less demanding than its
federal counterpart, however, in that it does not require proof that the adverse
party engaged in wrongdoing with the purpose of preventing the declarant
from testifying. On the other hand, it incorporates several restrictions that the
federal rule does not. First, only statements that "purport[] to narrate, describe
or explain the infliction of threat of physical injury upon the declarant," satisfy
256. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370 (West 2009).
257. California Evidence Code Section 240, incorporated by reference into Section
1370(a)(2), defines "unavailable" in terms substantively identical to Federal Rule of Evidence
804(a). See id § 240.
258. Id. § 240(b).
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the exception. 259 Second, the statement must have been made "at or near the
time of the infliction or threat of physical injury." 260 Third, it must have been
made "under circumstances that would indicate its trustworthiness." 261 Fourth,
it seeks to ensure that the jury will hear an accurate version of the declarant's
statement by requiring that the statement was either preserved electronically or
in writing, or made to specified witnesses. 262 Fifth, the offering party must
give the adverse party pretrial notice of its intention to offer a statement under
the provision.263 None of the reported state opinions in the case even raised the
question of whether these additional requirements might be an adequate
substitute for Giles's right to cross-examine the declarant, because Crawford
foreclosed-or at least appeared to foreclose-such an argument when it
rejected Roberts .264
V. GILES AND THE DEFINITION OF "TESTIMONIAL"
In Giles, the state conceded on appeal that Ms. Avie's statement to the
police, accusing Giles of assaulting and threatening her, was testimonial.265
Thus, the Supreme Court did not formally address whether it was testimonial
or not. Nevertheless it is possible to read the opinions in the case as suggesting
that anywhere from one to five of the Justices might be willing to revisit how
the Confrontation Clause should be applied to police questioning of witnesses,
or, at least, of domestic assault complainants. Moreover, Justice Scalia's
plurality opinion includes dicta which, if applied literally, may define
266"testimonial" much more narrowly than first suggested in Crawford. Thus,
the decision may have created more uncertainty about the scope of the
Confrontation Clause than it has resolved.
259. Id. § 1370(a)(1). This is because, unlike the federal rule, which by its terms applies
generally to criminal and civil trials, the California rule is applicable only in cases involving the
infliction or threat of physical injury.
260. Id. § 1370(a)(3).
261. Id. § 1370(a)(4). Some factors to be considered in assessing trustworthiness are set
forth in Section 1370(b).
262. Id. § 1370(a)(5).
263. Id. § 1370(c).
264. See Crawford v. Washington, 54 U.S. 36, 63-68 (2003).
265. Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2682 (2008). Although in hindsight this may have
been a mistake, one cannot blame the prosecutor for making this concession, because the facts in
Giles appear indistinguishable (for Confrontation Clause purposes) from those in the Hammon
case, which the Court, by an eight-to-one vote in Davis, classified as testimonial. Justice Thomas
rejected that conclusion. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 834 (2006) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from the result in Hammon). The facts in Hammon, and a comparison of those facts to
the facts in Davis, are found in Part ILE, supra.
266. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
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A. The Five Opinions in Giles
Four of the five opinions in Giles expressed or implied a willingness to
267reconsider, or at least narrow, the definition of testimonial. Starting with the
most unequivocal, they can be summarized as follows:
1. Justice Thomas concurred in the result in Giles only because the state
conceded that Ms. Avie's statement was testimonial, but adhered to his
previously stated position that only actual testimony and statements elicited
during formal, Mirandized police interrogation, were testimonial.268 Justice
Thomas wrote:
The contested evidence is indistinguishable from the statements
made during police questioning in response to the report of domestic
violence in Hammon v. Indiana, decided with Davis v. Washington.
There, as here, the police questioning was not "a formalized
dialogue"; it was not "sufficiently formal to resemble the Marian
examinations" because "the statements were neither Mirandized nor
custodial, nor accompanied by any similar indicia of formality"; and
"there is no suggestion that the prosecution attempted to offer [Ms.
Avie's] hearsay evidence at trial in order to evade confrontation."
269
Justice Thomas thus provided a fifth vote to vacate Giles's conviction and
remand for further proceedings, but provided that fifth vote supporting Justice
Scalia's approach to the forfeiture rule only in the most technical sense; should
a similar case arise, a prosecutor probably could win Justice Thomas's vote in
favor of the admissibility of the victim's statement simply by refusing to
concede that the statement was testimonial, which (in Justice Thomas's view)
would moot the issue of the intent or purpose with which the defendant killed
his victim.
270
2. Justice Alito, who had raised no objections to the Court's opinion in
Davis, suggested that he may now be willing to reconsider how that case
defined testimonial. His concurring opinion in Giles reads, in its entirety, as
follows:
I join the Court's opinion, but I write separately to make clear
that, like Justice Thomas, I am not convinced that the out-of-court
statement at issue here fell within the Confrontation Clause in the
first place. The dissent's displeasure with the result in this case is
understandable, but I suggest that the real problem concerns the
scope of the confrontation right. The Confrontation Clause does not
apply to out-of-court statements unless it can be said that they are the
267. Only Justice Souter's concurring opinion contains no direct or indirect reference to the
definition of testimonial. See Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2694-95 (Souter, J., concurring in part).
268. Id. at 2693 (Thomas, J., concurring).
269. Id. at 2693 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547
U.S. 813, 840 (2006)).
270. See id. at 2693-94.
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equivalent of statements made at trial by "witnesses." It is not at all
clear that Ms. Avie's statement falls within that category. But the
question whether Ms. Avie's statement falls within the scope of the
Clause is not before us, and assuming for the sake of argument that
the statement falls within the Clause, I agree with the Court's
analysis of the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing.2 l
This can be read several ways. The narrowest reading is that the facts in
Giles differ in some significant way (that do not appear in any published court
opinion) from those in Hammon, which might make the statements in Giles
non-testimonial, without affecting the continued validity of Hammon-Davis.
But Justice Alito makes no such suggestion that this is the case. 27 2 Moreover,
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Alito explicitly (if tentatively) aligned
himself, wrote in his own Giles concurrence that "[t]he contested evidence is
indistinguishable from the statements made during police questioning in
response to the report of domestic violence in Hammon v. Indiana, decided
with Davis v. Washington."273  The most natural reading of Justice Alito's
concurrence, therefore, is that he entertains serious second thoughts about
whether statements to the police such as those in Giles and Hammon are
testimonial.
Thus, Justice Alito's vote lends only lukewarm support 274 for Justice
Scalia's conclusion that the prosecutor must show that it was the defendant's
"design[] to prevent" the declarant from testifying,275 because if a prosecutor in
a similar case contested whether the statement was testimonial, she might win
Justice Alito's vote on that issue, as well as Justice Thomas's.
3. Early in his dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and
Kennedy, emphasized: "It is important to underscore that this case is premised
on the assumption, not challenged here, that the witness' statements are
testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause"2Y6 -language that at
least hints at dissatisfaction with the current definition of "testimonial." Thus,
if the Court grants certiorari on a similar case, it is possible that the dissenters
in Giles might combine with Justices Thomas and Alito to significantly narrow
the definition of what constitutes testimonial statements to the police.
271. Id. at 2694 (Alito, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
272. Justice Alito is of course under no obligation to discuss such a factual distinction
between Hammon and Giles, because the state did not contest the testimonial nature of Ms.
Avie's statement. Id. at 2682 (majority opinion). The absence of such an indication, however,
logically suggests that factual distinctions are not what drove Justice Alito to write his opinion.
273. Id. at 2693 (Thomas, J., concurring).
274. Justice Alito's support for the Scalia plurality opinion is lukewarm because if Ms.
Avie's statement and others like it are not classified as testimonial, as a practical matter, a
prosecutor will need to rely on the forfeiture doctrine to overcome a Confrontation Clause
objection in far fewer cases.
275. Id. at 2683 (majority opinion).
276. Id. at 2695 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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4. Dictum in Part II-E of Justice Scalia's majority opinion also suggests a
narrowing of that definition, albeit not with regard to statements to the
police.
277
B. Part II-E of Justice Scalia 's Opinion
In Crawford v. Washington, Justice Scalia, writing for a seven-Justice
majority, stated: "An accuser who makes a formal statement to government
officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to
an acquaintance does not."278 This of course prompts the question: suppose a
person who becomes the defendant's "accuser" makes a "remark to an
acquaintance" that is not a "formal statement," but is not all that "casual,"
either? Is that "remark" testimonial? The Supreme Court has not yet
considered such a case, but Justice Scalia offered dictum about this situation in
Giles.
In Part II-E of his opinion in Giles, Justice Scalia acknowledged that the
decision might make it more difficult to prosecute domestic violence
prosecutions, but emphasized that the Confrontation Clause would at most bar
"only testimonial statements," 279 and added, in dictum, "[s]tatements to friends
and neighbors about abuse and intimidation, and statements to physicians in
the course of receiving treatment would be excluded, if at all, only by hearsay
rules, which are free to adopt the dissent's version of forfeiture by
wrongdoing. ' 280 This dictum, if taken at its broadest, would significantly limit
the definition of testimonial and therefore the impact of the Confrontation
Clause, and not just in domestic abuse prosecutions.
1. Statements to Friends and Neighbors
No doubt most "[s]tatements to friends and neighbors about abuse and
intimidation ' 281 are non-testimonial, 282 and most lower courts have so held.283
277. Id. at 2692-93 (majority opinion).
278. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
279. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2692.
280. Id. at 2692-93.
281. Id. at 2692-93.
282. At present most such statements probably do not fall within any of the traditional
hearsay exceptions, but as Justice Scalia pointed out in Giles, Congress, or a state, is free to craft
a new exception (or broaden an existing exception) to include such a statement without running
afoul of the Confrontation Clause, so long as the statement itself is not testimonial. See id. at
2687-88 & n.2. A number of states have in fact created such exceptions, including, for example,
California Evidence Code Section 1350. A number of states have created hearsay exceptions in
sexual assault and child abuse cases. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
283. See People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 927-28 (Colo. 2006) (holding that statements by a
sexually abused child to his father and his father's friend were non-testimonial because the
statements were not solemn or formal statements made to a governmental actor); State v. Rivera,
844 A.2d 191, 201-02 (Conn. 2004) (holding that declarant's statements to his nephew were
outside the core category of testimonial statements of concern in Crawford because he made the
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But suppose the declarant-complainant tells a friend, "D said if I try to leave
him again, he'll kill me. But I just have to get away from him! So if anything
happens to me, tell that to the police!" That certainly seems to qualify as a
"solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or
proving some fact," the early nineteenth century definition of "testimony" that
Justice Scalia cited approvingly in Crawford.2 84 At least one state court has
held that a statement of this nature is, in fact, testimonial. 285 This result is
"statement in confidence and on his own initiative to a close family member, almost eighteen
months before the defendant was arrested and more than four years before his own arrest");
Demons v. State, 595 S.E.2d 76, 80 (Ga. 2004) (holding that decedent's statements to a co-worker
about the source of bruises on his upper arms and chest and about a threat made by the defendant
"were not remotely similar to such prior testimony or police interrogation, as they were made in a
conversation with a friend, before the commission of any crime, and without any reasonable
expectation that they would be used at a later trial"); State v. Blackstock, 598 S.E.2d 412, 420
(N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that statements by the victim of an armed robbery to his wife and
daughter were not testimonial because they were not made under a reasonable belief that they
would be used prosecutorially (the victim made the statements when his health was improving,
but he died later)). There are several federal cases that also use the same reasoning. See, e.g.,
United States v. Lee, 374 F.3d 637, 645 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that statements made by co-
defendant to his mother were non-testimonial because they were casual conversations that did not
implicate the core concerns of the Confrontation Clause and were admissible against defendant
because they were co-conspirator statements made in furtherance of criminal activity); Evans v.
Luebbers, 371 F3d 438, 444-45 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that numerous statements made to ten
different witnesses by defendant's estranged wife, who was later murdered, that she was scared of
defendant, that defendant had verbally and physically abused her, that she intended to divorce
defendant, and that she obtained a protective order against defendant, were not testimonial
because the statements did not fit within the expressed definitions of testimonial set out by
Crawford); Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 84 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that such statements were
not testimonial because they were not ex parte testimony or its equivalent; were not contained in
formalized documents; were not made during custodial confession; and were made to a private
person and not under circumstances that would lead an objective witness to believe that the
statements would be available for use a later trial).
Court treatment of statements by a child sexual assault victim fall into a straightforward
pattern. Statements to a parent or other relative or guardian, made before the authorities were
notified, are classified as non-testimonial; statements to police officers or child advocates or
others acting in an official or semi-official capacity are generally classified as testimonial. See,
e.g., In re Rolandis G., No. 99581, 2008 WL 4943446, at *9-10 (I11. Nov. 20, 2008) (statements
by child victim to a child advocate during interview were testimonial in nature, and admission of
statements violated the respondent juvenile's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation). But see
People v. Geno, 683 N.W.2d 687, 692 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that a child sexual assault
victim's statement taken during an interview conducted at the Children's Assessment Center was
non-testimonial because the interviewer was "not . . . a government employee"). For further
discussion of this issue, see 4 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 25, § 28:20 at 652-53 (7th ed.
2000 & Supp. 2008).
284. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,51 (2004).
285. State v. Sanchez, 177 P.3d 444, 450 (Mont. 2008) (holding that a note written before the
declarant's murder was a testimonial statement, and its admission was harmless). Fifteen days
before defendant shot her to death, his girlfriend wrote a note, "To whom it concerns," relating
that Raul Sanchez
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consistent with how the Court defined testimonial in Crawford, but is arguably
inconsistent with the Court's dictum in Giles.
2. Statements to Physicians in the Course of Receiving Treatment
Justice Scalia's second example in his Giles dictum of a non-testimonial
statement--"statements to physicians in the course of receiving
treatment" 286 -also sweeps broadly enough to incorporate statements that
could be otherwise be considered testimonial. Suppose a woman tells her
doctor: "See what my boyfriend did to me? I want you to write up every cut,
every bruise, every contusion, so the prosecutor will have lots of evidence
when I take the #!#$@% to trial!, 287 This would seem to qualify as a "solemn
declaration," 288 or (to quote a potential definition of "testimonial" that Justice
Scalia in Crawford cited without endorsing), as a statement "that was made
under circumstances which would lead to an objective witness reasonably to
believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial. 289
3. Implications in Non-Domestic Abuse Prosecutions
If Justice Scalia and those who joined his opinion intended the Giles dicta to
be taken at full face value, this suggests a very narrow definition of
"testimonial" in any criminal case-a definition limited, perhaps, solely to
statements made by, or to, the police (and 911 operators acting as their agents,
as in Davis), and, perhaps, to other government agents and officials, but which
would never include statements made to those unaffiliated with the
government. This would have broad implications in cases unrelated to
domestic violence.
Consider: A man named V is shot and killed. F, V's friend tells the police:
"Two weeks ago, V told me that he and D went partners on a drug deal, but the
cops showed up and V had to flush the stuff, and D was threatening to kill V
unless V paid him for the drugs. V told me if anything happened to him, I
told me if I ever was cought [sic] with another man while I was dating him, that he
would kill me. Raul told me he had friends in Mexico that had medicine that would kill
me and our doctors wouldn't know what it was till it was to [sic] late and I would be
dead. So if I unexspetly [sic] become sick and on the edge of death, and perhaps I die
no [sic] you will have some answers.
Id. at 447. See also Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86
GEO. L.J. 1011, 1041 (1998) (arguing that where the "declarant not only anticipated but desired
that her statement be used testimonially, and she used her listener as an intermediary between her
and the authorities, . . . the statement should clearly be deemed testimonial").
286. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2693.
287. Or picture a doctor treating a battered woman, telling her, "I am required by law to
report all cases of probable domestic assault; tell me who did this to you," in response to which
the woman then identifies her attacker.
288. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
289. In Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52, the Court cited this as one of several possible definitions of
"testimonial." See supra Part V.A.
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should tell the police." At D's trial for murder, the prosecutor calls F as a
witness and seeks to have F repeat what V allegedly told him.
Even a more formal statement might be classified as non-testimonial.
Suppose a corporate officer uncovers evidence of embezzlement or fraud and
confronts employee X with that evidence. X tearfully asks if the matter might
be quietly disposed of if he resigns and pays the money back over time. The
supervisor says, "No, I'm afraid I have to report this to our attorneys and,
frankly, they'll probably insist on going to the police." X nevertheless
confesses-and gives a detailed explanation as to how he and co-employee Y
committed the crime. X and Y are indicted. At their trial, the prosecutor seeks
to have the supervisor repeat X's entire statement-including his incrimination
of Y.
In each of these scenarios, the declarant either intended, or was bluntly
informed, that his statement would be used prosecutorially. If Justice Scalia's
dicta become law, D and Y's Confrontation Clause objections will nevertheless
be overruled. Each statement, moreover, might well fall within Federal Rule
of Evidence 804(b)(3), 290 and therefore be admissible to convict D of
murdering V and to convict Y of embezzling funds-without either defendant
having the opportunity to confront and cross-examine his accuser.
Unless the Court grants certiorari on a case involving arguably testimonial
statements to a witness with no government affiliation, these uncertainties will
give evidence scholars much to speculate and hypothesize about, which, of
course, is a good thing-for evidence scholars and the law reviews that publish
their articles. Judges and attorneys, on the other hand, will flounder and grope
for answers, hoping they guess right.
VI. CONCLUSION
Prior to the Giles decision, several things about the post-Crawford
Confrontation Clause seemed clear. It applied only to "testimonial"
statements. 29  Although the Court had not yet provided a comprehensive
definition of "testimonial," that term included, for certain, actual testimony and
other sworn statements, 292 and statements elicited during "Mirandized"
custodial interrogation. 293 The Court had also provided a workable approach
to classifying statements made to police officers and 911-operators as a crime
was being reported and during the initial investigation of it: statements made
(even in response to official questioning) that related to an ongoing emergency
290. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (providing that a statement made against the declarant's interest
may be admitted over a hearsay objection).
291. Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173, 1179 (2007); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S.
813, 823-24 (2006).
292. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52.
293. Id.
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were not testimonial; 294 once the emphasis switched to past events, however,
such statements-whether elicited by questioning or not-would be
295testimonial. It was also quite clear that the forfeiture doctrine (that is, that a
defendant forfeited his right to raise a Confrontation Clause objection if his
wrongdoing prevented the declarant from testifying) was a firmly embedded
296exception to the Confrontation Clause, although there was uncertainty as to
what the prosecutor had to prove about the defendant's mental state or intent
with regard to the declarant's unavailability.
Despite the fractured nature of the decision in Giles v. California, the Court
has provided an answer to that latter question which, though inevitably fuzzy at
the margins, is clear in its essence: to establish that a defendant forfeited his
right to make a Confrontation Clause objection to hearsay evidence, a
prosecutor must establish that "the defendant engaged in conduct designed to
prevent the witness from testifying."297 But this rule won only a tentative and
uncertain majority of the Justices;298 and the governing statement of what the
prosecutor must show, as well as specific suggestions as to how that might be
accomplished, emerge, not from Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court, but
from a concurring opinion signed by two Justices and lukewarm support for
the concurrence by three dissenting Justices.
299
Giles leaves several other Confrontation Clause issues unsettled. Although
that case dealt with (and causes problems for the prosecution in) the
application of the Confrontation Clause in domestic violence prosecutions, it
has implications in other types of cases as well. 300 Moreover, it did not address
other troubling issues about the application of the Confrontation Clause in
domestic violence cases.
Somewhat more disturbing is that the five opinions submitted by the Justices
suggest that the firm consensus most observers thought existed, as to when
statements in response to official questioning are "testimonial," may not be so
firm after all. Two concurring Justices stated a strong inclination to revisit that
issue 301 and three dissenting Justices at least hinted at a willingness to do so.32
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court, moreover, includes broad, sweeping
dicta that would categorically exclude from "testimonial," many statements
that might otherwise fall within the definitions of that term provided, or
suggested, in Crawford.3 °3
294. See supra Part II.E.3.
295. See supra Part II.E.3.
296. See supra Part 11.E.4.
297. Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2680 (2008).
298. See supra Part 111.B.I.
299. See supra Part V.A.
300. See supra Part V.B.
301. See supra Part V.A (noting the opinions of Justices Thomas and Alito).
302. See supra Part V.A (discussing Justice Breyer's dissent).
303. See supra Part IV.B.2.
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Giles thus provides only an uncertain answer to the question it explicitly
addressed, while raising additional uncertainties on broader and more
fundamental aspects of the post-Crawford Confrontation Clause. Such
uncertainties are probably inevitable when, as it did in Crawford, the Court
decides to throw out prior precedent and impose a new approach to an
important constitutional right, but at present the application of the
Confrontation Clause in many cases is every bit as unpredictable as it was
under the prior approach Crawford replaced. We must hope that the Court will
soon choose another case in which to address these issues-and that the
decision in that case, unlike Giles, will produce more clarity than confusion.
